Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal World by Hynes, Richard M.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2002
Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal World
Richard M. Hynes
Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Hynes, Richard M., "Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal World" (2002). Faculty Publications. Paper 967.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/967
OPTIMAL BANKRUPTCY IN A NON-
OPTIMAL WORLD 
RICHARD M. HYNES* 
Abstract: Consumer bankruptcy insures individuals against misfortune. 
Like other forms of insurance, bankruptcy reduces an individual's 
incentive to guard against misfortune and provides her with an 
incentive to overstate her need for relief. The "first-best," or optimal, 
bankruptcy system, like the first-best tax or public assistance system, 
solves these moral hazards without any loss of efficiency. In bankruptcy, 
this first-best approach would deny relief to debtors responsible for 
their own distress and reduce the deserving debtors' obligations to an 
amount commensurate with their ability to pay. While the Bankruptcy 
Code tries (in part) to follow this first-best approach, such a utopian 
system requires omniscient judges who can perfectly determine which 
debtors deserve relief and how much a deserving debtor can pay. Real 
bankruptcy judges have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code to implement 
a second-best, or feasible, bankruptcy system that accounts for the 
limited information that they possess. 
INTRODUCTION 
The truly destitute have little to fear from their creditors. Their 
poverty prevents their creditors from seizing anything of value, and 
the days when default meant imprisonment, enslavement, or even 
death have long since passed.1 Bankruptcy protects those with some-
thing left to lose-a home, a car, future income, etc.2 Without con-
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I Massachusetts imprisoned defaulting debtors as late as 1857. CHARLES WARREN, 
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 (1935). Ancient Athens considered defaulting 
on a debt a capital crime. E.g., Lawrence H. White, Bankruptcy as an Economic Intervention, 1 
J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 281, 281 (1977). In ancient Rome the creditors of a defaulting 
debtor could enslave the debtor or divide the debtor's body into proportionate shares. Id. 
2 See, e.g., Kathy Bergen, Bankruptcy Becoming Prosperity's Partner Largely a Declaration of 
the Middle Class, CHI. Thin., July 5, 1998, at 6 (quoting Elizabeth Warren, "[bankrupt debt-
1 
2 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 44:1 
sumer bankruptcy, creditors could reach these assets,3 and debtors 
would be worse off. Bankruptcy therefore provides debtors a 
benefit-debt relief-which has economic value to the debtor only to 
the extent that the debtor otherwise could have paid the debt. Be-
cause an ideal bankruptcy system would provide this benefit only after 
the debtor has suffered some misfortune, bankruptcy can be viewed 
as similar to a public insurance program.4 
If private insurance markets functioned perfectly, society would 
not need a consumer bankruptcy system to provide this form of in-
surance. Debtors could instead rely on private contracts to insure 
against risks such as illness and unemployment that trigger financial 
distress.5 Yet the world is not so perfect. Although consumers cur-
rently can purchase various forms of health, property, and credit in-
surance6 that, like bankruptcy, relieve them of their debt after they 
have suffered some reversal of fortune, private insurance may be un-
able to achieve perfect outcomes because of certain well-recognized 
market failures. For example, contracting costs may be too high to 
allow consumers to negotiate effective insurance against all risks.7 
Consumers may also suffer from a host of cognitive or volitional fail-
ures that prevent them from purchasing appropriate insurance or re-
ors] are middle-class-that's what's scary about this .... They are not marginal workers. 
They are you and me, they are our neighbors."). 
8 Non-bankruptcy law protects some of these assets as well. See infra notes 165-173 and 
accompanying text. 
• See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLAss: AMERICANS IN 
DEBT 3-6 (2000) (arguing that bankruptcy plays an important role in the larger social 
safety net). 
~ For studies describing the financial shocks that have led to individual bankruptcies, 
see TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FoRGIVE OuR DEBTORs 95-102, 166-77 (1989); 
SuLLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 15-22, 75-107, 141-71, 172-98; Teresa A. Sullivan et al., 
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 
AM. BANKR. LJ. 121, 130-31 (1994). 
6 Credit insurance typically insures against risks such as unemployment, disability, 
death, and destruction of property. For an overview of credit insurance, see CoNSUMER 
CREDIT INs. Ass'N, THE 2000 FAcT BooK OF CREDIT-RELATED INSURANCE 4-7 (2000). Con-
sumer advocacy groups have been highly critical of credit insurance. See, e.g., Consumers 
Union & the Ctr. for Econ. Justice, Credit Insurance: The $2 Billion a Year Rip-Off, Inef-
fective Regulation Fails to Protect Consumers 2-45 (1999), at http://www. consumersun-
ion.org/pdf/ credit. pdf. 
7 Some scholars question whether contracting costs can justify the presence of collec-
tions limitations because the frequency of credit transactions may allow the use of stan-
dardized contracts; debtors could then select a loan based on the forgiveness it offered as 
well as its other terms. See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and Per-
sonal Bankruptcy, 22 EcoN. INQUIRY 188, 189 (1984). 
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ststmg the siren song of easy credit.8 Finally, individuals may have 
greater information about their vulnerability to financial distress than 
do lenders or insurers, and lenders and insurers may refuse to con-
tract for fear of attracting high-risk individuals.9 
The bankruptcy laws may be viewed as a response to these market 
failures. Under this view, the "optimal" bankruptcy system could be 
defined as the set of legal rules that best approximates the insurance 
contract that the consumer would purchase if the market failures did 
not exist. Unfortunately, a claim that judges should attempt to im-
plement the optimal bankruptcy system provides little guidance be-
cause the literature lacks a good description of such a system. The lit-
erature on consumer bankruptcy has focused on issues such as 
whether debtors should be entitled to a complete or limited discharge 
of their debtslO and whether, and to what extent, debtors should be 
entitled to keep certain types of property after bankruptcy.11 More 
recently, scholars have focused on other policy issues such as the per-
centage of a bankrupt debtor's income that should be exempt from 
8 See, e.g., THOMAS H. jACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 232-42 
(1986). This Article suggests that bankruptcy insures debtors against their own negligent 
financial management. See infra notes 227-244 and accompanying text. 
9 This is what is known as a "market for lemons" problem. Effectively, insurers believe 
that only high-risk individuals will buy insurance and therefore charge high rates. Because 
of the high rates, low-risk individuals will not want the insurance and the expectation is 
self-fulfilling. See George A. Akerlof, The Marlut for "Lemons": Qy,ality, Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 488, 489-90 (1970) (demonstrating the fundamental 
problem by using the used car market as an example); Gillian Lester, Unemp[qyment Insur-
ance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REv. 335, 361-62 (2001) (applying the lemons 
problem to insurance). The "asymmetric" information can have other adverse conse-
quences as well. For example, in the consumer credit context, "good" credit risks may 
agree to harsh collections terms, such as no bankruptcy protection, in order to distinguish 
themselves from "bad" risks and thus receive lower rates. "Good" risks will find these terms 
less costly than "bad" risks because they will default less often. One can construct a model 
in which both good and bad credit risks would be better off if these harsh terms were 
banned; one can also construct a model, however, in which these harsh terms are neces-
sary to prevent the lemons problem discussed above. For a more thorough explanation of 
this problem, see Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Fi-
nance, 4AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 168,173-76 (2002). 
Jo See, e.g., jACKSON, supra note 8, at 229-34; Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in 
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953, 976-91 (1981); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHio ST. LJ. 1047, 1047-70 (1987). 
II See, e.g., Vern Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 678, 746-48 ( 1960); Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning Up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus 
on Exemption Laws, 74 AM. BANKR. LJ. 275, 275-78 (2000); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: 
Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE LJ. 1459, 1459 (1959). 
4 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 44:1 
seizure,12 the extent to which the debtor should have a choice be-
tween complete and limited discharges of debts,13 and the limitations 
on a debtor's freedom to reaffirm pre-bankruptcy debts. 14 Missing 
from the literature is a broader inquiry into the bankruptcy system 
that debtors and creditors would themselves choose in the absence of 
market failure. 
To fill this gap in the literature, this Article looks to, and adapts, 
current theories regarding the optimal structure of public assistance 
programs and taxation.l5 Bankruptcy has obvious similarities to these 
programs. Like bankruptcy, public assistance programs provide 
benefits to individuals based on their need.l6 Although the type of 
benefit is different in bankruptcy than in public assistance pro-
grams-the forgiveness of debts owed to creditors rather than food 
stamps or welfare payments financed by the public fisc-the systems 
are otherwise quite similar. Indeed, public assistance programs are 
frequently justified as a form of public insurance,l7 and both the op-
timal bankruptcy system and the optimal public assistance program 
would confer their benefits on the truly needy without blunting the 
12 See, e.g., Wenli Li, To Forgive or Not to Forgive: An Analysis of U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy 
Choices, 87(2) FED. REs. BANK RICHMOND EcoN. Q. 1, 15-18, 21 (2001); Hung:Jen Wang & 
Michelle J. White, An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reforms, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 255, 274-86 (2001). 
15 See Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29]. LE-
GAL STUD. 585, 587-601, 605-09 (2000); Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer 
Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commissions 
Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 1-11 (1998); A. Mechele Dicker-
son, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End justify the Means1, 75 AM. BANKR. LJ. 243, 245-46, 269-
77 (2001); Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd Zywicki, Its Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. 
REv. 177, 177-83; Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. LJ. 1079, 1080-1101 
(1998). 
H See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 13, at 601-08; Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. 
White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. LJ. 709, 709-
11 (1999); Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. 
LJ. 483, 498-502 (1997). 
15 See generally A.B. Atkinson, Income Maintenance and Social Insurance, in 2 HANDBOOK 
OF PuBLIC EcoNOMICS 779 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985) (reviewing 
the relevant literature on public assistance); Gary Burtless, The Economists Lament: Public 
Assistance in America, 4]. EcoN. PERSP. 57 (1990) (reviewing the relevant literature on pub-
lic assistance);Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare 
Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC EcoNOMICS, supra, at 991 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin 
Feldstein eds., 1985) (reviewing the relevant literature on taxation). 
16 See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Ametica's Uneasy Relationship with the Working Poor, 51 
HASTINGS LJ. 17,19, 23-25 (1999). 
17 See, e.g., Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 
AM. EcoN. REv. 542, 542-43 (1969). 
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incentives for beneficiaries to engage in desirable behavior-for ex-
ample, to work, to save, etc.ts 
But bankruptcy is not just about giving relief to debtors; it is 
about taking from them too. Like taxation, bankruptcy often requires 
individuals to pay certain sums of money, although the payments in 
bankruptcy go to creditors rather than to the public fisc. The goal of 
optimal taxation mirrors that of an optimal public assistance pro-
gram: it seeks to extract payments from those capable of paying with-
out diminishing the incentives to engage in productive behavior. 
In constructing theories of an optimal public assistance or tax 
program, economists usually begin by describing the "first-best" sys-
tem, or the system that society should adopt if the government were 
omniscient,19 In both cases, the optimal system would impose a fixed 
obligation to pay (for taxation) or a fixed benefit (for public assis-
tance) based not on the individual's actual income or assets, but on 
the individual's ability to earn.2° While this first-best solution is easy to 
describe, it is also trivial in the sense that it has limited application in 
the real world where the government is far from omniscient. The so-
lution is, however, still valuable because it establishes a benchmark for 
evaluating feasible second-best solutions. Deviations from that 
benchmark are then justified by the imperfections in the governmen-
tal processes that run the programs. 
The application of opti~al tax and public assistance theory to 
bankruptcy leads to an interesting insight. In many ways, the Bank-
ruptcy Code appears designed to achieve the first-best solution. This 
goal is particularly evident in Chapter 13, which gives debtors not a 
complete discharge of their obligations, but merely an adjustment of 
debts,21 replacing one set of debt obligations with another that is, ide-
ally, based on the debtor's ability to pay.22 If that goal were attainable, 
the bankruptcy relief conferred would be optimal. It would provide 
the debtor with insurance against financial distress with none of the 
efficiency losses associated with diminishing the debtor's incentives to 
produce and save. 
1s See infra notes 45, 102 and accompanying text. 
19 See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, The Design of Income Maintenance Pro-
grammes, 62 REv. EcoN. Srun. 187, 188, 193-95 (1995) . 
. 20 See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995-96. 
21 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled, "Adjustment of Debts of an Individ-
ual with Regular Income." 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2000). 
22 See id. 
6 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 44:1 
Yet, as in taxation and public assistance, the first-best solution in 
bankruptcy is also an unrealistically utopian solution because judges 
lack the information necessary to accurately measure a debtor's ability 
to pay and to determine whether the debtor deserves relief. Because 
of this, judges cannot prevent all debtor misbehavior. Just as the opos-
sum plays dead to ward off predators, bankruptcy may cause some 
debtors to exaggerate their plight in order to avoid repayment or gain 
a greater amount of relief; call this the "opossum problem." It occurs, 
for example, when a debtor conceals assets or hides his ability to earn 
by working less than he is capable of working. In addition, just as the 
grasshopper fails to plan for the coming winter,23 the possibility of 
bankruptcy relief may cause some debtors to live beyond their means 
or engage in other negligent or even willful misbehavior that makes 
financial distress more likely; call this the "grasshopper problem." Un-
like the opossum, the grasshopper's need is real, though it could have 
been avoided. In a world with such problems, the optimal bankruptcy 
system is a second-best solution-meaning one that accounts for the 
limited ability of courts to identify the grasshoppers and opossums 
among us and for the inevitable distortion of debtor incentives. 
It is here, however, that the Bankruptcy Code is notably deficient. 
In many instances, the Code gives little guidance to courts that must 
adjust the utopian goal to the realities of the actual world. In re-
sponse, courts have improvised. They have seized on the discretion 
granted them explicitly or implicitly by the Bankruptcy Code and 
have attempted to develop a second-best bankruptcy system that ac-
counts for their own limitations.24 In many respects, these improvisa-
tions parallel solutions developed in implementing tax and public as-
sistance programs.25 This Article concludes that most of this judicial 
improvisation is both necessary as a matter of policy and consistent 
with the language of the existing Bankruptcy Code.26 
25 In Aesop's fable of the ant and the grasshopper, the grasshopper plays the summer 
away while the ant toils to save for winter. There are numerous versions of this fable and 
they differ largely on how the grasshopper is treated in the winter. See, e.g., AEsop's FABLES 
23 (jacob Lawrence, Illus., U. Wash. Press, 1997). Several prominent bankruptcy scholars 
have used the story of the ant and the grasshopper to explain the moral hazard created by 
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 13, at 219-20; Lynn M. LoPucki, Common 
Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. LJ. 461, 463-65 (1997); Warren, supra note 13, 
at 1084. This Article adopts an expanded definition of the grasshopper problem that in-
cludes willful misbehavior, such as a willful and malicious tort, that makes financial distress 
more likely. 
24 See infra notes 325-330 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 62-67, 95 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 407-424 and accompanying text. 
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Bankruptcy judges do not deny relief to the spendthrift or the 
negligent27 and, despite frequent discussion of the grasshopper prob-
lem,28 few, if any, academics argue that bankruptcy judges should. 
Perhaps this should not surprise us. Neither public insurance pro-
grams nor private insurance contracts deny relief to the negligent, 
and the standard explanations for this approach apply to bankruptcy 
as well.29 Both public insurance programs and private insurance con-
tracts, however, deny relief for willful misconduct.3° Here bankruptcy, 
or more specifically Chapter 13, provides an exception, in the form of 
a superdischarge that would even relieve the debtor of a judgment for 
a willful and malicious tort such as sexual assault.31 Most bankruptcy 
judges limit the impact of this anomaly by using the good faith stan-
dard of Chapter 13 to restrict access to the superdischarge to those 
debtors who have received other punishment and who try to repay as 
much as possible.s2 
Recently, scholars have paid more attention to the opossum prob-
lem in the form of proposals for means testing that would test 
whether a debtor can repay any of his debts.33 Rather than engage in 
this debate, this Article focuses on the only major consumer bank-
ruptcy chapter that requires debtors to repay out of future income: 
Chapter 13.34 Though the text of Chapter 13 appears to invoke the 
utopian approach of adjusting debts based on a debtor's ability to pay, 
judges resist this approach because they are skeptical of their own 
ability to estimate a debtor's future income.35 This causes some judges 
to adopt a strained reading of the Code that effectively creates a tax 
on the debtor's income in bankruptcy.36 This approach is unfortunate 
because judges could address their concerns in ways that do less vio-
lence to the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and better use 
27 See infra notes 228-234 and accompanying text. 
28 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 120-131 and accompanying text. 
so See infra notes 142-148 and accompanying text. 
51 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2000); see, e.g., Solomon v. Cosby, 67 F.3d 1128, 1130 (4th Cir. 
1995); Petty v. Belanger, 232 B.R. 543, 545 (D. Mass. 1999) (decided under Chapter 7, 
although debtor originally filed for Bankruptcy under Chapter 13); In re Carsrud, 161 B.R. 
246, 247 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993). 
52 See infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
55 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
!H As discussed below, debtors filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 need not repay 
anything out of their future income. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
55 See infra notes 325-330 and accompanying text. 
56 See infra note 307 and accompanying text. 
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what abilities they do have.37 Specifically, judges could rely on subse-
quent modifications to a bankruptcy plan when they can provide a 
workable estimate of the debtor's future income, and should dismiss a 
debtor's bankruptcy petition when they cannot.38 
Part I provides a brief outline of the optimal taxation and public 
assistance literatures and the theory of the second-best. Part II applies 
the lessons of this literature to the bankruptcy context and defines the 
utopian and second-best bankruptcy systems. Part III compares these 
bankruptcy systems to the existing Bankruptcy Code and argues that, 
although several aspects of Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code ap-
pear to try to implement a utopian bankruptcy system, judges should 
instead consider the limits of their abilities and work to implement 
the second-best system within the constraints of the current language 
of the Bankruptcy Code.39 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO OPTIMAL TAXATION AND PuBLIC AssiSTANCE 
This Article seeks to define the optimal bankruptcy procedure in 
the abstract and to determine the extent to which this procedure 
should guide judicial analysis of existing legislation. To accomplish 
this goal, this Article analogizes the search for an optimal bankruptcy 
procedure to a well-known problem in economics: the search for an 
optimal program of progressive taxation and public assistance.40 
For at least the past one hundred years, economists have tried to 
define optimal progressive taxation and public assistance programs to 
deal with the problems of poverty and inequality.41 Modern analyses 
of these redistributive programs view them either as a form of altru-
ism or insurance.42 The insurance argument takes one of two forms. 
57 See infra notes 331-333 and accompanying text. 
58 See infra notes 331-333 and accompanying text. 
59 See infra notes 163-406 and accompanying text. 
40 Although public assistance could take the form of a negative income tax such as the 
earned income tax credit, these problems are often treated separately in the literature. See, 
e.g., Atkinson, supra note 15, at 782, 804-06; Burtless, supra note 15, at 68-77; Stiglitz, supra 
note 15, at 1038. The differences in these literatures, however, are unimportant for the 
purposes of this Article. 
41 See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 991 ("For more than a hundred years, economists have 
attempted to show that progressive taxation can be justified on more fundamental princi-
ples."). 
42 See, e.g., Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 17, at 542-43. Earlier efforts at justifying 
progressive taxation and public assistance relied on the idea that redistribution would 
increase aggregate happiness because the poor value an additional dollar of income more 
than the rich. See, e.g., NEIL BRUCE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND TilE AMERICAN EcoNOMY 213-19 
(2d ed. 2001). This approach received a great deal of criticism because it assumes that the 
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First, many forms of public assistance, such as unemployment insur-
ance, may provide real insurance to existing individuals as the high-
income individuals of today may be poor tomorrow and thus may 
themselves benefit from the relief provided.43 Second, other redis-
tributive policies, such as progressive taxation, may insure the indi-
vidual against the lottery of birth that grants some individuals the abil-
ity to earn very little and others the ability to earn a great deal.« 
Regardless, the concept is roughly the same. The government should 
choose the redistributive program that an individual would choose 
before he knew the outcome of the risk against which the system is 
designed to insure, the system that he would choose.behind a ''veil of 
ignorance. "45 
Economic articles on taxation or public assistance usually pro-
ceed in two steps. First the author defines the first-best system, or the 
system that the government should implement if it were omniscient 
and could directly solve the opossum and the grasshopper problems 
described above.46 But economists generally do not believe that the 
government is omniscient, and they focus more heavily on the de-
scription of the second-best system that is optimal in a world of opos-
sums, grasshoppers, and a government that can only imperfectly iden-
tify them.47 
government can compare the happiness of different individuals. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman 
& Thomas Griffeth, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 
CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1917-18 (1987). For a review of the development of the justifications 
for these redistributive policies, see Atkinson, supra note 15, at 791-95. 
4S See, e.g., BRUCE, supra note 42, at 209-13. 
44 See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-
Taking, 61 J. PoL. EcoN. 434, 434-35 (1953);John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individual-
ist Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. PoL. EcoN. 309, 314-16 (1955); see also 
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 793-95 (discussing the insurance justifications of redistributive 
programs). 
45 The reader may associate this term with the work of John Rawls. See JoHN RAwLs, A 
THEORY OF JusTICE 12, 136-42 (1971). In Rawls's version of the veil of ignorance argu-
ment, the debtor is not just ignorant as to whether he will be rich or poor in the future, 
but is also ignorant as to the chance of each circumstance occurring. Id. at 12, 137. There-
fore, according to Rawls, an individual would want an equal distribution of income unless 
an unequal distribution aids the most disadvantaged member of society. See id. at 148-49. 
This conclusion has some importance for the interpretation of the second-best tax dis-
cussed below. Differences between Rawls's work and the earlier work of Harsanyi, however, 
are not central to this Article. 
46 See, e.g., Besley & Coate, supra note 19, at 188, 193-95. 
47 See id. at 188, 195-205. 
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A. The First-Best Tax or Transfer 
An omniscient government can adopt an elegantly simple first-
best tax or transfer system that allows it to achieve whatever social 
goals it desires without any loss of efficiency: the first-best system im-
poses on individuals a lump-sum tax or provides to individuals a lump-
sum transfer based on their ability to pay.48 To implement this system, 
the government projects how much each individual would earn if he 
worked the efficient number of hours and then requires the individ-
ual to pay an amount equal to any projected earnings in excess of the 
amount that the government decides the individual should consume. 
If the individual's projected earnings are less than the expenses that 
the government thinks proper, the government gives the individual a 
transfer equal to the shortfall. For example, assume that the govern-
ment determines that all individuals should consume $50,000 worth 
of goods and services. If the government determines that a high-
ability individual should work hard enough to earn $90,000, it will re-
quire that individual to pay a tax of $40,000 regardless of the amount 
that he earns. If the government determines that a low-ability individ-
ual should only have to work hard enough to earn $10,000, it will give 
that individual a transfer of $40,000 regardless of the amount that he 
actually earns. 
Each individual may work more or less than the government es-
timated, but the amount that the individual works, and therefore the 
amount that he actually earns, does not affect his tax or transfer; that 
is the meaning of a lump-sum tax. Because individuals' actual earn-
ings do not affect their tax or transfer, their return from working an 
additional hour, their take-home pay, matches the social return, the 
amount that they produce, and they will work the efficient number of 
hours that the omniscient government predicted. For example, the 
high-ability individual could work harder and earn $100,000. If he 
did, he would be entitled to keep the extra $10,000 that he earned. 
He would, however, not value the additional $10,000 as much as the 
leisure that he would have to sacrifice in order to earn it. If he did 
value the additional $10,000 more than the leisure he had to sacrifice 
to get it, then it would not have been efficient for him to work only 
enough to earn $90,000, and the omniscient government would have 
determined that he should work enough to earn $100,000. Therefore, 
48 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995-96. 
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the high-ability individual ends up earning the $90,000 that the om-
niscient government predicts. 
This does not mean that the first-best tax will not affect the num-
ber of hours that the individual will work. In fact, the tax will likely 
cause the individual to work more hours than he would have because 
he will be less wealthy and will therefore be willing to sacrifice more 
leisure in order to gain more income. For example, if the government 
requires our high-ability individual to pay a tax of $90,000 and he 
earns only $90,000, he would be left with nothing to eat. To avoid 
starvation, he would be willing to work a great deal in order to earn 
just a little more than the government will take. This wealth effect, 
however, is irrelevant to the question of whether the tax is efficient.49 
A tax is efficient if, given the current amount of tax the individual 
must pay, the individual values an hour of leisure more than the 
amount of money he could produce by working an additional hour. A 
lump-sum tax is efficient because an individual is free to work another 
hour and keep the entire amount that he produces, but he chooses 
not to do so. 
The government can use a lump-sum tax to achieve as much pro-
gressivity as it desires without any loss of efficiency.50 Each individual 
would work an efficient number of hours if the high-ability individual 
paid a tax of $40,000 and the low-ability individual received a transfer 
of $40,000 or if the high-ability individual paid no tax and the low-
ability individual received no transfer. To determine the amount of 
each tax or transfer, one must consider the purpose of the program. 
Assume that the program is motivated by insurance so that the gov-
ernment chooses the program that an individual would choose if he 
did not know how he would fare in a lottery of birth that gives some 
individuals the ability to earn $90,000 and some the ability to earn just 
49 When studying the effect of income taxation, economists refer to two effects, the 
wealth (or income) effect and the substitution effect. The wealth effect refers to the ten-
dency of individuals to work more because taxes make them poorer and hence they value 
an additional dollar of income more highly and are willing to sacrifice more leisure to get 
it. The substitution effect refers to the fact that the individual does not get to keep all of 
the last dollar earned. The tax therefore makes leisure cheaper and the individual substi-
tutes leisure for work. It is the substitution effect, and not the wealth effect, that deter-
mines the efficiency of a tax. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 42, at 428-32 (describing the in-
come and substitution effects in the context of an income tax). 
50 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995-96 (noting that optimal lump-sum taxes can 
equalize the consumption of each individual and yet still provide each individual with the 
incentive to work an amount such that her marginal rate of substitution between goods 
and leisure equals her marginal product). 
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$10,000.51 Assume further that the happiness that an individual de-
rives from an additional dollar of consumption depends only on how 
much he is consuming,52 and that as the individual consumes more 
each additional dollar yields less happiness. If these assumptions hold, 
the government should set the first-best tax or transfer such that the 
individual will always consume the same amount regardless of his abil-
ity to earn;53 the government should structure the program so that 
the low-ability individual and the high-ability individual will each con-
sume $50,000. Because each is consuming the same amount, each 
would place the same value on an additional dollar of consumption 
and there would be no gain from redistributing wealth from one to 
the other. The government would demand that the high-ability indi-
vidual pay a tax equal to $40,000, or the amount by which his pro-
jected earnings of $90,000 exceed $50,000 and offer a transfer to the 
low-ability individual of $40,000 or the amount by which his projected 
earnings of$10,000 fall below $50,000. 
B. The Second-Best and Moral Hazard 
The first-best system described above effectively assumes away the 
moral hazards (the grasshopper and opossum problems) that redis-
tributive programs create by assuming that the government is omnis-
cient. If the government cannot identify the high-ability individuals, 
these individuals will have an incentive to "play 'possum" and claim a 
low earnings ability in order to pay a lower tax or receive a larger 
transfer. For example, the political debate over whether welfare re-
51 Because many public assistance programs do not appear to be structured to serve an 
insurance motive, economists often view them as a product of altruism or at least limited 
altruism. See, e.g., Besley & Coate, supra note 19, at 189. Still, even under these assumptions 
the first-best system is just a lump-sum tax based on recipients' ability to support them-
selves. ld. at 188. 
52 This assumption is more controversial than it appears. For example, one might 
think that the amount of leisure available may affect the happiness an additional dollar 
yields. 
58 The government will assign each individual a consumption level such that the hap-
piness that each individual would derive from an additional dollar of consumption, his 
marginal utility of consumption, would be the same. IT this were not the case, aggregate 
happiness could be increased by redistributing money to those who valued it more highly. 
IT all individuals have the same preferences and the happiness that they derive from an 
additional dollar of income depends solely on how much they are consuming, then every 
individual must consume the same amount. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995-96. This 
does not mean that all individuals are equally happy; in fact, those who can earn more are 
likely worse off because the government will expect them to work more as long as leisure is 
a "normal" good. See id. at 995. 
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cipients can in fact support themselves54 is an argument over the im-
portance of the opossum problem. It is a debate over whether the re-
cipients are truly needy or whether they can support themselves. In 
addition, if the government cannot distinguish between those whose 
low-ability is a result of bad luck and those who failed to invest 
sufficiently in the future, individuals will have an incentive to behave 
like the grasshopper. The debate over whether welfare laws lead to 
more teen pregnancies55 is a debate over the grasshopper problem. 
All would agree that the teenage· mother is needy, but some would 
argue that she would not have become needy but for the prospect of 
relief.56 To the extent that the government cannot identify either the 
opossums or the grasshoppers, the optimal tax is a second-best tax. 
1. The Grasshopper Problem and Partial Insurance 
The optima] taxation literature sometimes assumes that each in-
dividual receives his earnings ability randomly through a lottery of 
birth;57 it effectively ignores the grasshopper problem. One's ability to 
earn, however, often depends on prior choices such as the decision to 
seek further education or to work hard and earn a promotion. Al-
though a lump-sum tax based on an individual's earnings ability 
would not distort his decision to work after the tax is implemented, 
the individual will have much less incentive to develop the ability to 
earn if he knows that the tax will be implemented. H the taxation sys-
tem will leave everyone with the same amount of money to consume, 
there is no incentive to become skilled.58 For example, assume that in 
order to become a high-ability individual capable of earning $90,000 a 
year, an individual must endure several years of rigorous study. Hone 
knew that the tax structure was such that one would consume $50,000 
54 See Dickerson, supra note 16, at 17-18. 
55 See, e.g., STAFF oF HousE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105th Cong., 1998 GREEN 
BooK 537,537-41 (Comm. Print 1998). 
56 Id. (arguing that some teens would not have become pregnant but for the existence 
of a social welfare system). 
57 See Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REv. 1477, 
1482-90 (1994) (describing the endowment at birth with quantifiable earning potential, 
discountable to present value). But see Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income 
Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Human Capita~ 51 TAx L. REv. 1, 7-11 (1995) (arguing, 
among other things, that human capital endowment is not always a good proxy for earn-
ings potential) . 
58 In fact, individuals may actually be worse off if they have a higher earnings ability. If 
leisure is a "normal" good so that individuals would want to consume more of it as its price 
(the available wage) falls, then the government will expect them to work more hours and 
yet consume the same amount as others. See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995. 
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regardless of how much one could earn, there would be no incentive 
for one to study. 
An omniscient government can solve the grasshopper problem. If 
some individuals have low earnings ability solely because of hard luck 
and others have low earnings ability solely because of their poor 
choices, the government could provide relief for the unfortunate but 
not the lazy. More realistically, both hard work and fate play a role in 
determining an individual's earnings ability. An omniscient govern-
ment, however, can still implement a first-best tax or transfer system 
by assessing an arbitrarily high tax, effectively a punishment, when-
ever the individual does not invest sufficiently in his future. Because 
individuals will fear this penalty, they will not shirk. 
If the government cannot separate the grasshoppers from the 
unfortunate, then the only way to make the individual bear the full 
costs of shirking is to make the individual bear the full costs of adverse 
events beyond his control as well. The only way to provide the indi-
vidual with the proper incentives to study and generate the ability to 
earn $90,000 is never to provide relief when he may earn only 
$10,000, even if this low earnings ability could have resulted from mis-
fortune rather than misbehavior. Because this would destroy the in-
surance that redistributive programs are designed to provide, the gov-
ernment again faces a trade-off. It must balance its citizens' need for 
insurance against the fact that this insurance will cause its citizens to 
shirk. What results is a system of only partial insurance. Low-ability 
individuals are asked to pay less than high-ability individuals, but not 
enough less to make them equally well-off. The resulting system is still 
progressive, just not as progressive as it would have been if the gov-
ernment could solve the grasshopper problem directly. Likewise, pub-
lic insurance programs offer the individual only partial insurance 
against his loss. For example, unemployment insurance typically pays 
about one-half of the unemployed's former wages.59 
2. The Opossum Problem and Income Taxes 
Even if the government could not estimate an individual's earn-
ings ability, a lump-sum tax or transfer would still have the desirable 
effect on each individual's work incentives because the individual 
59 See, e.g., MARK A. RoTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 799 (2d ed. 1999) ("States 
usually set weekly benefit amounts as 1/23, l/24, 1/25, or 1/26 of the earnings obtained 
by applicants during the relevant calendar quarters, resulting in benefit amounts ranging 
from 50 to 56% of average weekly earnings."). 
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would retain all of his last dollar earned regardless of the size of the 
tax or transfer.60 H the government cannot identify those who can 
earn more, however, all individuals must pay the exact same amount 
of tax or else those who are asked to pay more would "play 'possum" 
and claim that they have a low earnings ability. The government could 
not meet its progressivity goals with such a system. 
The optimal tax literature therefore focuses on the second-best 
tax or transfer, or the tax that utilizes only the information that the 
government can actually observe.61 In the basic optimal taxation 
model the government can observe the individual's actual income but 
nothing else.62 A precise description of the second-best tax is quite 
complicated and requires strong mathematical assumptions.63 This 
Article, however, need only describe the second-best tax as a tax that 
generallf'4 increases with the individual's actual income; the second-
best tax is an income tax. Because an income tax deprives individuals 
of some of the benefit of an additional hour of work, it will discourage 
them from working and thus lead to some inefficiency.65 Arl income 
tax allows for some progressivity, however, as the high-ability individ-
ual would have to earn, and therefore consume, very little in order to 
"play 'possum" and emulate the low-ability individual. This second-
best tax reflects a compromise between the goals of efficiency and 
60 See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 996-1004. 
61 See, e.g., Besley & Coate, supra note 19, at 195-205 (exploring the optimal system of 
public assistance); Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 996-1023 (reviewing the basic lessons of the 
literature). 
62 See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 997. A significant portion of the public assistance litera-
ture discusses the use of other proxies to tag individuals deserving of relief or the inten-
tional design of programs to screen those able to support themselves. See, e.g., George A 
Akerlof, The Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and 
Manpower Planning, 68 AM. EcoN. REv. 8, 8 (1978). In addition, the government may be 
able to punish recipients in order to dissuade those who can support themselves from 
seeking assistance. See, e.g., Besley & Coate, supra note 19, at 188 (discussing the use of 
"workfare" to screen for those debtors with a low earnings capacity). While punishment 
mechanisms such as the loss of one's credit reputation undoubtedly could play an impor-
tant role in an optimal bankruptcy system, they are beyond the scope of this Article. 
63 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 1023-30. 
54 Under some assumptions the optimal income tax may actually decline over some 
ranges of income. See, e.g., id. at 1022. 
66 In theory, it is possible that the wealth effect could dominate the substitution effect 
and the individual could decide to work more after the imposition of an income tax. This 
makes little difference, however, because only the substitution effect has any bearing on 
whether a tax is efficient. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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progressivity.66 Because society must compromise, the second-best tax 
is neither as progressive nor as efficient as the first-best tax.67 
II. APPLYING THE OPTIMAL TAX LESSONS TO BANKRUPTCY 
This Part applies the results of the optimal taxation and public 
assistance literature to bankruptcy and demonstrates that the first-
best, or utopian, bankruptcy system adjusts the debts of a deserving 
debtor to an amount that is commensurate with the debtor's potential 
to repay.6s Like the first-best tax, however, this utopian bankruptcy 
system relies on information that is not realistically available.69 There-
fore, one needs to define a feasible second-best bankruptcy system. 
In a world of limited information, we may not want judges to 
search for all of the grasshoppers among us for fear that they may mis-
takenly deny relief to the deserving. In addition, the ability of judges 
to identify the opossums depends on the information that they have 
at their disposal, and on this matter reasonable minds may disagree. If 
one follows the fairly pessimistic assumptions of the optimal taxation 
literature and assumes that judges can only observe a debtor's actual 
income, the optimal bankruptcy system resembles an income tax.70 
This Article argues, however, that judges can sometimes use a debtor's 
earnings history to provide a workable estimate of an individual's po-
tential earnings.71 When they can, judges should instead adopt an ad-
justment of debts approach to bankruptcy tempered by subsequent 
modifications of the amount of debt when the estimation proves 
grossly inaccurate. 
Like progressive taxation or public assistance, bankruptcy policy 
may be justified either as a means of providing insurance for debtors 
or as fulfilling certain altruistic goals of society. 72 While this Article 
66 See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 1006 (noting the equity-efficiency tradeoff). 
67 See id. 
66 See infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text. 
69 See supra notes 46-4 7 and accompanying text. 
7o See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra notes 420-422 and accompanying text. 
72 Economists consider an individual altruistic if his happiness depends at least in part 
on the condition of others. See Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 17, at 543. Because altruis-
tic individuals do not want to see their neighbor destitute, they may prefer a system like 
bankruptcy that makes extreme poverty less likely. Because it is the creditor, and, ulti-
mately, debtors themselves who bear the cost of this insurance, bankruptcy offers some 
advantages over public assistance financed from the public fisc. In particular, public assis-
tance may encourage debtors to engage in risky financial behavior, such as over-borrowing, 
because public assistance partially shields them from the consequences of their actions. See 
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1402 
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focuses on the insurance that bankruptcy provides, the policy pre-
scriptions would not radically change if altruism were stressed. 73 Not-
withstanding the commercial success of Las Vegas and Atlantic City, 
consumers generally do not like risk and purchase insurance even 
though, on average, they pay more to the insurers than the insurers 
pay out in claims.74 The insurer writes these contracts because the 
consumer pays a premium that exceeds the expected payments on the 
insurance contract. The insurer can charge premiums that the con-
sumer is willing to pay because the insurer writes contracts with many 
different consumers and is therefore fairly indifferent to the risk that 
any one consumer may suffer an unfortunate event that requires 
compensation.75 In other words, the insurer can effectively "diversify" 
the risk away.76 Consumers choose contracts that balance the insur-
ance that they receive against the premium that they must pay. 
Bankruptcy effectively makes creditors the insurer of their debt-
ors by transferring wealth from creditors to debtors, through a reduc-
tion in debts, after debtors have suffered some misfortune. 77 Many 
( 1985); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doc-
trine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 
286 (1995). The fact that the public fisc does not bear the costs of bankruptcy, however, 
makes it difficult to offer a prediction of how the altruist would set the debtor's consump-
tion in bankruptcy. Assume that the debtor's consumption in bankruptcy is set by an altru-
ist who is not also a borrower. If the altruist is a true altruist and seeks to maximize the 
debtor's expected happiness, the altruist would just choose the same bankruptcy proce-
dure that the debtor herself would choose in an insurance model. Therefore, assume that 
the altruist cares only about the debtor's consumption. Because the altruist does not have 
to pay for the debtor's consumption, the debtor pays for it through higher interest rates 
and reduced access to credit; there is nothing to limit the debtor's choice. This is not to 
say that altruism plays no role; the altruist may care about some combination of the 
debtor's happiness or consumption or may only care that these stay above certain levels. 
This Article will focus, however, on the insurance role of bankruptcy to avoid this confu-
sion. 
73 The utopian bankruptcy system would still leave the debtor with a fixed obligation. 
The amount of this obligation, however, would be determined by the amount that the 
altruist would choose for the debtor rather than the amount that the debtor would choose 
from behind a veil of ignorance. As explained above, however, the amount that the altruist 
would choose is uncertain. See supra note 72. 
7f The profitability of insurance companies is based on the premise that they will re-
ceive more premiums than they will pay in claims. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL PoLINSKY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 54 (2d ed. 1989). 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See infra notes 203-204, 228 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of con-
sumer bankruptcy as insurance, see Charles G. Hallinan, The Fresh Start Theory in Consumer 
Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 98-109 
(1986). 
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creditors willingly supply this insurance by extending credit while 
knowing that their debtors may file for bankruptcy. Like the insur-
ance company, the large creditor contracts with many consumers and 
can diversify away much of the risk of any one consumer's suffering 
the adverse circumstances that lead to default.78 Just as the insurer 
demands compensation for the risk through premiums, most credi-
tors demand compensation for the risk of default through higher in-
terest rates.'9 
Because lending markets are highly competitive80 and money can 
be readily invested outside the consumer lending market,81 debtors 
are likely to bear most if not all of the cost of bankruptcy protection 
in the form of higher interest rates or reduced access to credit.82 
78 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
79 See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 77, at 105. 
80 Credit markets may not be perfectly competitive. Some consumer credit markets, 
however, such as those for credit card debt or mortgages, are now truly national markets 
and it would be very difficult to claim that any lender truly has market power. In addition, 
state and federal regulatory structures work to prevent excessive concentration in local 
lending markets. Furthermore, there is some evidence that different types of lenders-
banks, finance companies, etc.-compete for the consumer's business. See, e.g., A. 
Charlene Sullivan, Competition in the Market for Consumer Loans, 36 J. EcoN. & Bus. 141, 141 
(1984). 
81 Even if consumer lenders are unable to invest readily in other sources, they are only 
financial intermediaries. The ultimate source of credit, the individuals who own the wealth 
that is lent, can choose from among a dizzying array of investments including domestic 
and foreign securities and banks that loan to corporations. See, e.g., William H. Meckling, 
Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 (4) LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS. 13, 19 (1977). 
82 According to economists, the question of who bears the cost of bankruptcy is an-
swered by examining the elasticity of the supply and demand for credit. If credit markets 
were perfectly competitive and if consumer lending were but a small part of the overall 
investment opportunities, then the supply of credit would be perfectly elastic. That is, if 
the return to lending increased even infinitesimally above the return to other forms of 
lending, then money would flow into the consumer lending market until the return fell to 
the normal level. Likewise, if the return decreased, money would flow out until the return 
rose to the normal level. Therefore, if generous bankruptcy laws increase the rate of de-
fault, then money will flow out of the consumer lending market until interest rates rise to 
raise the expected return of lending to the normal level. See id. at 19-24. Of course, some 
question the elasticity of the supply of credit and thus question whether creditors and in-
vestors will bear more of the costs of bankruptcy. See, e.g., J. Fred Weston, Some Economic 
Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41 (4) LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 47, 48-51 (1977). 
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers do bear at least some of the costs of laws that 
restrict collections. See, e.g., Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and 
Demand, 112 Q.J. EcoN. 217, 230-31 (1997) (finding that debtors who live in states with 
larger property exemptions pay higher interest rates and have a reduced access to credit). 
The primary results of this Article, however, do not depend on how much of the costs of 
bankruptcy are borne by lenders. Even if the lenders incurred much of the costs of bank-
ruptcy, debtors would still have an incentive to choose an efficient means of collection 
because they could then extract a more generous system. Note too that bankruptcy will 
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Therefore, the optimal bankruptcy procedure is the bankruptcy pro-
cedure a rational debtor would include in a hypothetical contract 
made at the time of borrowing if the debtor knew that the amount of 
insurance and the structure of the contract would affect the other 
terms of credit offered by the creditor. The optimal bankruptcy sys-
tem, like the optimal tax, is the system that an individual consumer 
would choose at the time of borrowing behind a veil of ignorance as 
to his future condition. 53 
In assessing the debtor's ability to pay, the optimal bankruptcy 
procedure would likely consider several factors including the value of 
the debtor's assets and any unusual expenses that the debtor faces. 
This Article follows the general approach of the optimal taxation and 
public assistance literature, however, and focuses solely on the 
debtor's earnings.84 One can extend the analysis to consider the 
debtor's assets and expenses, but the gain in realism would not be 
worth the resulting analytical complications at this time.85 The vast 
majority of bankrupt debtors do not have,86 and likely never had,87 
significant assets. In addition, while unexpected expenses, such as a 
hospital bill, are often cited as a cause of bankruptcy,88 these expenses 
are often one-time events that affect the total obligations of debtors 
but not their expenses going forward. Therefore, they do not affect 
the total amount that debtors should pay in bankruptcy. In addition, 
provide a net benefit if consumers value the insurance provided more than the additional 
costs of credit. Therefore, bankruptcy could actually expand the demand for credit, and, if 
the supply of credit is not perfectly elastic, creditors could actually capture much of the 
gain from bankruptcy. Therefore, the relevant question is whether the insurance provided 
by bankruptcy is more valuable than the costs of the distortions it creates. See, e.g., DanielJ. 
Villegas, Regulation of Creditor Practices: An Evaluation of the FTC's Credit Practice Rule, 42 J. 
EcoN. & Bus. 51, 56--64 (1990) (testing whether limitations on credit provide a net benefit 
to consumers and lenders). 
88 See analogous discussion, supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
Sf See supra notes 20, 49 and accompanying text. 
85 The author plans to revisit these issues in a future paper. 
85 See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & jAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAw OF DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS 426 (4th ed. 2001) ("The property exemptions may make little difference 
because the debtors who file for bankruptcy may not own much of value that isn't already 
mortgaged to the hilt."). 
lfl According to the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, half of all non-homeowners 
had a net worth of less than $4,200. See Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. 
Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, Fed. Res. Bull. 7 (Jan. 
2000), available at http:/ /www.federalreserve.gov /pubs/ oss/ oss2/98/bull01 OO.pdf. 
Moreover, this low net worth does not appear solely attributable to an excess of debts. Only 
63.5% of these non-homeowners listed any debts at all, and of those that did list debts, half 
had debts of less than $6,000. See id. at 21. 
88 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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many bankruptcy scholars have abandoned faith in the ability of 
bankruptcy judges effectively to estimate a debtor's reasonably neces-
sary expenses,89 and both the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion's proposed reforms90 and proposed legislation91 would limit con-
sideration of the debtor's particular expenses in the great majority of 
filings. 
The analogy between optimal bankruptcy and optimal taxation 
or redistribution is imperfect. Many of the limitations of the analogy 
are discussed below, but two points deserve special note. First, when 
implementing a tax or public assistance program, the government 
may transfer as much wealth to an individual as it wishes, provided 
that it raises enough money to balance its budget. By contrast, the 
bankruptcy judge can do no more than forgive all of the debtor's ob-
ligations; even in a hypothetical bankruptcy regime it would be odd 
for a judge to order a creditor to transfer additional funds to a debtor 
in default.92 
Second, while the optimal tax defines how all members of society 
should be treated, only an extremely small fraction of the population 
files for bankruptcy.93 The number of bankruptcy filings is even small 
when compared to the number of individuals who experience the un-
89 See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 13, at 19. Currently§ 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 
defines "disposable income" as income minus reasonably necessary expenses. See 11 U .S.C. 
§ 1325(b) (2000). 
90 See, e.g., NAT'L BANKR. REv. CoMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: ThE NEXT 1WENTY YEARS 262-
73 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT]. Interestingly, one of the leading advisors to this 
commission, Elizabeth Warren, is one of the leading advocates for the argument that un-
expected expenses often lead to bankruptcy. See supra note 5. This issue fits firmly within 
the theory of the second-best. While the first-best solution would adjust debtors' required 
repayment for their reasonably necessary expenses, judges may be unable to determine 
this amount. To the extent that they are unable to do so, differences in expenses must be 
ignored. 
91 See H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 707(b) (2) (A) (2002). 
92 One can obscure, at least temporarily, this distinction by assuming that debtors can 
over-borrow from the creditor and store the amount that they do not consume in a riskless 
asset so that the debtor will always repay something after default. The need for this as-
sumption, however, has important implications for bankruptcy law that will be discussed 
below. See infra note 290 and accompanying text. 
93 In the year 2001 there were approximately 1,452,000 non-business bankruptcy 
filings. See Am. Bankr. Inst., U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2001, available at 
http:/ /www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html [hereinafter Bankruptcy Filings 1980-
2001]. The population of the United States in the year 2001 was approximately 
275,000,000. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Annual Projections of the 
Total Resident Population as of July 1: Middle, Lowest, Highest, and Zero International 
Migration Series, 1999 to 2100, available at http:/ /www.census.gov/population/projec-
tions/nation/summary/np-tl.pdf [hereinafter Annual Projections of the Resident Popula-
tion]. 
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fortunate events that are often listed as causing the financial distress 
that leads to bankruptcy: unemployment, divorce, etc.94 If consumers 
are risk-averse, they should want insurance against all shocks, not just 
those that are severe enough to land them in bankruptcy. Therefore, 
the fact that bankruptcy provides no insurance to debtors except in 
those very rare circumstances when they fail to pay their obligations 
in full presents somewhat of a puzzle. 
This puzzle is not unique to bankruptcy. Perhaps part of the an-
swer95 can be found in an argument economists use to explain why 
many insurance policies only cover losses above some amount.96 This 
literature suggests that the cost of verifying the insured's loss prevents 
the insurance contract from covering small losses.97 Economists ex-
tend the same logic to bankruptcy and suggest that because bank-
ruptcy is a costly process, a court should only inquire as to the 
debtor's circumstances when the debtor's income is particularly low.98 
94 In 1998 there were a total of 1,135,000 divorces (including annulments) in the U.S. 
See Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Divorce, available at 
http:/ /www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm. In addition, in 1998, there were a total of 
6,210,000 unemployed persons in the U.S. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 404 (2000) [hereinafter Statistical Ab-
stract]. In that same year there were 1,398,182 non-business bankruptcy filings. See Bank-
ruptcy Filings 1980-2001, supra note 93. Of course this represents the number of filings 
and not the number of debtors. Married individuals may file for bankruptcy jointly. See 11 
U.S.C. § 302. Debtors may also file under Chapter 13 frequently, perhaps more than once a 
year, in order to delay foreclosure or other creditor remedies. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 
14, at 502-03 (discussing strategic refiling by Chapter 13 debtors). 
% An alternative answer is suggested by the literature on public assistance which faces 
a similar issue in that only a small fraction of citizens receive this assistance. See Statistical 
Abstract, supra note 94, at 380 (indicating that of about 71 million families surveyed in 
1998, about 2.6 million received some form of public assistance during 1997). Partly as a 
consequence, many economists focus on the altruistic goals that these programs may serve 
by ensuring that citizens do not fall below some minimal standard of living. See, e.g., Besley 
& Coate, supra note 19, at 187. Bankruptcy may play a similar role and may do so at less 
cost to the public fisc because the debtors themselves bear the cost of the protection in the 
form of higher interest rates and reduced access to credit. As discussed above, however, 
one needs stronger assumptions to predict the bankruptcy system that the altruist would 
choose. See supra note 72. Moreover, bankruptcy does not appear to be just about concern 
for the destitute. Studies of debtors in bankruptcy reveal that they resemble society as a 
whole. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 328; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 6. 
96 See, e.g., Robert M. Townsend, Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly 
State Verification, 21]. EcoN. THEORY 265, 265 (1979). 
97 See id. 
98 See, e.g., Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-
Period Problem, 52 REv. OF EcoN. STUD. 64 7, 648 ( 1985). Many of the results of this "optimal 
contracts" literature depend on very strong assumptions. The fundamental observation 
that information itself is costly, however, may have important implications for the structure 
of collections law. In particular, society may rationally choose to forego information in 
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When the court does inquire as to debtors' circumstances, however, 
the court should fully insure debtors so that they always consume the 
same amount after this investigation.99 Therefore, subject to compet-
ing goals, bankruptcy should try to ensure that a debtor consumes the 
same amount regardless of the severity of loss that led to bank-
ruptcy.too 
A. Utopian Bankruptcy 
If judges were omniscient and could identify the grasshoppers 
and opossums, they could implement a utopian bankruptcy system 
that, like the first-best tax, provides debtors with full insurance against 
adverse events and does not lead to any inefficiency.l01 To avoid the 
grasshopper problem, this utopian bankruptcy system would deny re-
lief when debtors' financial distress resulted from their own misbehav-
ior. For those debtors deserving of relief, the utopian bankruptcy sys-
tem would reduce their debt to a new amount based on their ability to 
repay, thus eliminating the opossum problem. 
1. Guarding the Gates of Bankruptcy: Identifying the Grasshoppers 
A utopian bankruptcy system would insure debtors against mis-
fortune without encouraging them to borrow an excessive amount or 
to misbehave in other ways that make financial distress too likely. An 
omniscient judge could achieve this goal by always granting relief for 
financial distress resulting from misfortune and never granting relief 
for financial distress resulting from misbehavior}02 
Unfortunately, this guideline may prove of little practical use be-
cause often both misbehavior and misfortune will jointly cause 
some circumstances and rely on other forms of verification such as punishment. See, e.g., 
Kelly D. Welch, From Debtor's Prison to Bankruptcy: The Enforcement of Optimal Debt 
Contracts 8 (Feb. 2001) (unpublished paper, on file with author). This Article, however, 
seeks to describe the bankruptcy system that society should choose given that the judge has 
collected all available information. 
99 See Gale & Hellwig, supra note 98, at 661. 
100 As discussed above, a court may wish to simply forgive all of the debts of all debtors 
who have no ability to pay. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
1o1 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
102 See Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow 
Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 148 (1986) (arguing 
for this approach for modifications of bankruptcy plans). 
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financial distress.l03 For example, a temporary period of unemploy-
ment might not lead to bankruptcy unless the debtor has failed to 
save a sufficient amount to withstand a temporary loss of income.l04 
Moreover, a firm may fire a worker in part because of an economic 
downturn and in part because the worker was not quite as diligent as 
his co-workers who were retained. 
Still, the utopian bankruptcy system can accommodate these 
mixed-cause shocks as well by focusing on the reasonableness of the 
debtor's choices. Just as the first-best tax assesses an arbitrarily large 
amount against those taxpayers who do not invest sufficiently in their 
future, the utopian bankruptcy system denies relief for these mixed-
cause shocks to those debtors who borrow an excessive amount or 
who otherwise take actions that unreasonably increase the probability 
of financial distress. Effectively, utopian bankruptcy denies relief to 
the negligent.105 Because debtors realize that they will not receive re-
lief if they are negligent, they will only borrow an appropriate amount 
and take the proper care to avoid financial distress. 
2. Projected and Potential Income: How Much Can the Opossum 
Pay? 
The utopian bankruptcy system, like the first-best tax or transfer 
system, provides individuals with no more relief than they need. In 
addition, just as the first-best public assistance program gives recipi-
ents a lump-sum transfer based on their need and the first-best tax 
system assesses a lump-sum amount based on taxpayers' ability to 
pay, 106 the utopian bankruptcy system leaves debtors with a lump-sum 
obligation based on their ability to pay. A debt obligation is a lump-
sum when the amount debtors must pay does not vary with their ac-
tual income.107 Therefore, the utopian bankruptcy system merely ad-
justs debtors' obligations to a new (lower) level consistent with their 
ability to pay. That is, in the utopian bankruptcy system the judge pro-
jects how much the debtor would earn if the debtor worked the 
1os See, e.g., Warren, supra note 13, at 1081 (describing inability of consumers to with-
stand shocks, such as divorce or unemployment, due to debt obligations they have in-
curred). 
104 See id. 
105 The debtors' negligence stems from the fact that their borrowing increases the 
probability of default by an unreasonable amount. 
lOG See supra notes 20, 48 and accompanying text. 
to7 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. 
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efficient amount and decides how much that debtor should retain for 
consumption.108 
For example, assume that an omniscient judge determines that if 
the debtor could have specified the amount in advance, he would 
have chosen to consume $3,000 per month in bankruptcy. H the om-
niscient judge determines that the debtor still has a relatively high 
earnings ability and thus could earn $7,000 per month if he worked as 
many hours as he should, then the judge would require the debtor to 
pay $4,000 per month. H the judge determines that the debtor has 
suffered a setback that leaves the debtor only able to earn $4,000 per 
month if he works as many hours as he should, then the judge would 
require the debtor to pay only $1,000 per month. The debtor's new 
obligations equal the amount by which his projected income exceeds 
the amount that the judge determines the debtor should consume.l09 
Because the debtor's new obligations are set with regard to his pro-
jected or potential income, the debtor retains the last dollar of his 
actual income and therefore he will work the efficient amount that 
the omniscientjudge predicted.ll0 
The optimal tax literature generally focuses on the number of 
hours that a debtor works, but the analysis can readily be applied to 
other questions as well. Perhaps because the issue strikes so close to 
home, law professors ask how much a debtor should be required to 
repay if he chooses an occupation that offers more attractive non-
pecuniary benefits over one that offers a higher salary.m For exam-
ple, assume that an individual can choose to work in private practice 
at a salary of approximately $200,000 a year or in academia at a salary 
of approximately $100,000 a year. According to the logic of optimal 
taxation, even though the debtor would earn double the monetary 
income by working in private practice, he should still pay the same 
amount that he would have paid had he worked in academia.112 If the 
amount that debtors must repay depends on their choice of occupa-
1os See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. 
no This follows from precisely the same logic as used in the optimal tax context. See su-
pra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
lll See jACKSON, supra note 8, at 246-47; Gross, supra note 102, at 136-38. 
112 See jACKSON, supra note 8, at 246-47 (arguing that if debtors are asked to pay more 
when their earnings are higher, they may choose jobs with more non-pecuniary benefits 
such as teaching). But see Gross, supra note 102, at 136-38 (arguing that the repayment 
required in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code should not be conditioned on what the 
debtor could earn because this would reduce the debtor's ability to choose alternative 
occupations and would therefore reduce the voluntary nature of bankruptcy). 
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tion, bankruptcy may distort their choices and debtors may choose to 
work as professors even if they would have preferred the added com-
pensation of private practice to the non-pecuniary benefits of acade-
mia. 
To say that a fixed repayment does not distort a debtor's choice 
does not mean that it will not affect the debtor's choice. A law profes-
sor, who under normal circumstances would find the compensation 
more than adequate, may be forced to work in the private sector if 
required to pay too much to her creditors. Because of this, Professor 
Gross suggests that the repayment amount should be set with regard 
to the debtor's occupation at the time of filing so as to preserve the 
debtor's freedom of choice.m A large required repayment, however, 
only forces the professor into private practice by affecting her wealth, 
or lack thereof. Clearly one of the benefits of wealth is that it affords 
an individual greater choices, and a lower repayment increases the 
debtor's wealth. This is also true of any other transfer of wealth, how-
ever, and one still needs a method for determining whether the 
debtor or her creditors are entitled to this wealth. 
In a utopian bankruptcy system, the judge would allow the debtor 
to keep as much wealth as the debtor would have included in a hypo-
thetical contract chosen at the time of borrowing from behind the veil 
of ignorance as to the debtor's actual future condition.114 Note that 
this does not necessarily mean that debtors must always earn as much 
as they possibly can. It is easier to understand this point if one first 
focuses on the question of how many hours debtors should work. 
Debtors would not agree to a contract that could force them to work 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week; all debtors would gladly 
pay a slightly higher interest rate in exchange for some leisure. Like-
wise, at least some debtors would contract in advance for the right to 
work in a position that does not yield the highest pecuniary earnings 
available because they would find the more remunerative alternative 
occupation intolerable. Whereas in practice it may be extremely 
difficult to determine what position the debtor would have chosen, in 
a utopian world an omniscient judge could accomplish this task. 
Therefore, the omniscient judge would base the debtor's required 
repayment on the occupation the debtor would have agreed to 
choose in the event of default. The judge, however, will require the 
m See Gross, supra note 102, at 136-40. 
114 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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debtor to repay the same amount regardless of the occupation that 
the debtor actually chooses. 
3. Accounting for Subsequent Shocks 
If a judge were truly omniscient and could predict the future, the 
debtor would never experience an unexpected shock. One might, 
however, instead adopt a weaker definition of an all-knowing judge 
and assume that although he can observe the debtor's innate earn-
ings ability, he cannot necessarily predict whether the debtor will ex-
perience the same unfortunate shocks that justify bankruptcy: unem-
ployment, illness, divorce, etc.l 15 If the judge cannot predict future 
shocks, a bankruptcy system that merely provides the debtor with a 
new, albeit reduced, debt obligation and no prospect of further relief 
cannot be optimal. Although such a system may provide the debtor 
with the appropriate incentives to work hard after filing for bank-
ruptcy, it provides no insurance against future misfortune. Therefore, 
the utopian bankruptcy system must allow for repetitive bankruptcy 
filings or modifications of the debts created by the original bank-
ruptcy filing. 
The prospect of further distress replicates the justification for 
bankruptcy but also replicates the grasshopper problem; this further 
distress may arise either from misfortune or from misbehavior. An 
omniscientjudge can apply the same solutions that are used to solve 
the grasshopper problem created by the existence of bankruptcy re-
lief.116 Just as before, if the debtor's future losses are always caused 
entirely by misbehavior or entirely by misfortune, an omniscient judge 
would simply deny any further relief in the former case and always 
grant full relief in the latter. 117 In the more realistic scenario in which 
losses are often caused by both misfortune and misbehavior, the om-
niscient judge would again focus on whether the debtor took 
115 Numerous articles in the optimal taxation literature have taken this approach and 
demonstrate that a lump-sum tax is not necessarily optimal. See, e.g., P.A Diamond et al., 
Optimal Taxation in a Stochastic Economy, 14]. PuB. EcoN. 1, 6-7 (1980);Jonathan Eaton & 
Harvey S. Rosen, Labor Supply, Uncertainty, and Efficient Taxation, 14 J. PuB. EcoN. 365, 365-
66 (1980);Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J. PuB. EcoN. 213, 
213 (1982); Hal R. Varian, Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance, 14]. PuB. EcoN. 49, 66 
( 1980). The primary purpose of these articles, however, is to accomplish what the standard 
optimal tax literature largely failed to do: justify progressive marginal income tax rates. 
116 See supra Part ll.A.l. 
117 See Gross, supra note 102, at 148 (arguing for this approach for modifications of 
bankruptcy plans). 
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sufficient care to avoid future losses and deny relief to those that did 
not. 
B. Second-Best Bankruptcy and the Centrality of Information 
In the utopian bankruptcy system, an omniscient judge solves the 
grasshopper and opossum problems by identifying and punishing 
those who misbehave. In the real world, judges are not omniscient. 
Because of this, and because some individuals may be unable to con-
trol their behavior, society may not want to punish all of the grass-
hoppers. Society, however, does need some method of catching the 
opossums. How the judge should search for the opossums among us 
depends on the information that she has at her disposal. A pessimist 
would assume that judges cannot observe any relevant facts about the 
debtor except his actual income and that he is indebted.l18 Under this 
view the second-best bankruptcy system looks very much like the sec-
ond-best tax; it is effectively an income tax. The guarded optimist 
would assume that although judges are not omniscient, they can 
sometimes provide a workable estimate of a debtor's potential in-
come, for example, by using the debtor's past income, level of educa-
tion, or some other observable predictor. Under this view, the second-
best bankruptcy system invokes some of the features of the utopian 
bankruptcy system, but with some adjustments for the limitations of 
judicial ability. 
1. Catching the Grasshoppers: Barring the Willful but Not the 
Negligent 
The above description of the second-best public assistance pro-
gram assumed that the government could not determine if an indi-
us The extreme pessimist might even reject the assumption that the judge may ob-
serve the debtor's actual income. To some extent this is undoubtedly true. Judges cannot 
effectively value some forms of economic income, such as the work product of a spouse 
that stays home to raise the family's children. But this problem is not unique to bankruptcy 
law; it is a frequent topic among tax scholars. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 
84 GEO. LJ. 1571, 1577-79 (1996). A more severe pessimist would assert that judges just do 
not have the resources to observe a bankrupt debtor's actual income after filing. H this is 
the case, the only method of solving the opossum problem is to punish those who seek 
relief; those who "can" pay will pay in order to avoid the punishment. See Rea, supra note 7, 
at 195. Perhaps this is a plausible description of Chapter 7, which appears to rely heavily on 
the threat of a damaged credit reputation to discourage debtors from filing. The use of 
punishment in a bankruptcy system is left to a future article as it leaves little role for a 
bankruptcy judge. 
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vidual took the appropriate steps to avoid her current state of need}l9 
This assumption probably understates the government's ability. For 
example, one might believe that the government can identify those 
individuals who left school early without a good justification or those 
workers that were fired due to shoddy attendance at work. Neverthe-
less, public assistance programs generally will not deny relief on these 
grounds or similar findings that an individual's distress resulted from 
her own negligent behavior.12o Perhaps this refusal to deny relief to 
the negligent is an unfortunate result of a "Samaritan's dilemma;"l2I 
altruists cannot credibly commit to denying relief to those that mis-
behave because the altruists would be unable to live with the resulting 
suffering. 
Private insurance contracts, however, generally take the same ap-
proach as public insurance programs.122 Private insurance contracts, 
like public assistance or bankruptcy, create a grasshopper problem 
because the insured is insulated from the full consequences of her 
actions that increase the probability or extent of loss}23 A property 
owner protected by fire insurance may be less inclined to buy a sprin-
kler system. A law student whose laptop is insured through a home-
owner's policy may take fewer precautions against theft. A motorist 
fully insured against liability may drive more carelessly. 
If insurers can observe undesirable behavior before any harm 
results, they can adjust their premiums accordingly. If the insurer can 
do so perfectly, the insured will once again bear the full costs of their 
behavior and they will choose the efficient level of care;l24 there will 
be no grasshopper problem. For example, motorists have a strong in-
centive to drive at a safe speed because their insurance rates will in-
crease if they receive a speeding ticket. As a practical matter, however, 
the insurer cannot continuously monitor all of the insured's behavior, 
and thus this approach cannot completely solve the grasshopper 
problem. 
119 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
12° See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 771 ("Mere inadvertence or inatten-
tion [that led to termination] will normally be insufficient to disqualify unemployment 
claimants. There must be evidence of intentional misconduct."). 
121 See, e.g., Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Government Transfer 
Policy, 85 AM. EcoN. REv. 46,46 (1995). 
122 See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 74, at 56. 
125 See id. 
124 See id. at 56-57; STEVEN SHAVELL, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF AcciDENT LAw 211 
(1987); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CoRNELL 
L. REV. 313, 337 (1990). 
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Alternatively, insurers could just exclude coverage for a loss if 
they discover that the insured failed to take sufficient care and was 
therefore negligent. As long as the insurer sets the standard of care 
correctly, the insured would then always maintain the proper level of 
care for fear that if he took less care he would receive no insurance at 
all. This is the same principle as the tort law's use of a negligence the-
ory of liability.125 Thus, there would be no reason for the debtor to 
buy insurance against liability based solely on negligence as it would 
always be cheaper to take the efficient level of care than to buy insur-
ance against the loss.I26 
At least from the beginning of the twentieth century, however, 
individuals have been able to purchase insurance against the conse-
quences of their own negligence,127 and today such insurance is 
common. Property insurance protects the insured against accidental 
loss.12s Fire insurance will pay a claim even if the insured negligently 
started the fire.l 29 In addition, individuals buy insurance against liabil-
ity based on negligence principles. Individuals buy homeowner's in-
surance policies that include protections against liability that gener-
ally requires a finding of negligence.l30 Today, many states effectively 
require motorists to buy insurance against the liability that results from 
their own negligence,131 and many motorists voluntarily buy insurance 
that far exceeds the minimum amount required by statute. 
Scholars advance two primary arguments for why the market of-
fers insurance against negligent behavior; both are based on human 
imperfections. First, an individual might buy insurance based on the 
belief that the risk of liability cannot be avoided by taking the proper 
level of care. A system that denies relief due to negligent behavior re-
125 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 124, at 8. 
12s See, e.g., id. at 212. 
127See, e.g., Breeden v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 119 S.W. 576, 
576 (Mo. 1909). 
128 See RoBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WID ISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMEN-
TAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 497 (1988). Some 
courts, however, have suggested in dicta that grossly negligent or reckless conduct could 
bar recovery. See id. at 539-41. 
129 See id. at 492. Some courts, however, have suggested in dicta that grossly negligent 
or reckless conduct could bar recovery. ld. at 492-93. 
1l!O See Schwartz, supra note 124, at 344. Homeowner's insurance policies also protect 
the homeowner against other risks as well. 
m See, e.g., RICHARD A PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSis oF LAw 221 (5th ed. 1998) 
("Automobile liability insurance is now almost universal, although this is partly because 
states required drivers to buy liability insurance or present equivalent evidence of financial 
responsibility for accidents."). 
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lies on judges and juries to make difficult decisions about whether the 
individual took the proper level of care, and the trier of fact may 
sometimes incorrectly deny relief.132 Second, and more controver-
sially, individuals might buy insurance based on the belief that they 
can't always maintain the proper level of care.l33 To understand the 
distinction between these two explanations, consider why drivers buy 
more than the minimum required liability insurance. The demand for 
insurance stems at least in part from the fear that a jury would 
wrongly find that the driver negligently caused an accident. The de-
mand, however, may also stem from the fear that the driver may be-
come momentarily distracted by his child and fail to see a red light. 
The insurer who issues a policy that protects the insured against 
his own negligence must charge higher premiums to account for the 
increased chance that the insured will suffer a loss and file a claim. In 
order to mitigate this grasshopper problem, and thus pay lower pre-
miums, the insured agrees to face some of the consequences of his 
negligence; the insured only buys partial insurance.134 For example, 
private insurance contracts often require the insured to pay a de-
ductible to cover part of any loss.135 In addition, the insurance policy 
may not cover all of the harms that are likely to result from the in-
sured's negligence. Some forms of automobile liability insurance de-
cline to cover the damage to the negligent motorist's own vehicle. 
Health insurance will not pay the insured for the pain of the insured's 
illness. Finally, the fact that the insured will need insurance in the fu-
ture also gives the insured an incentive to take care. For example, a 
motorist found to have negligently caused an accident will pay higher 
insurance premiums in the future. If the insured has too many acci-
dents, the insured may be unable to buy insurance altogether. 
If one views bankruptcy as just another form of insurance, then 
one might reject the utopian goal of denying relief to negligent debt-
ors. Although bankruptcy judges may be wise, they are clearly not 
omniscient and therefore will make errors. For example, to the extent 
that many bankrupt debtors borrowed too much to allow them to 
withstand a financial shock such as unemployment or divorce,136 a 
bankruptcy judge would be forced to rule on whether a debtor's bor-
rowing choices were reasonable in light of the debtor's financial pros-
132 SeeSHAVELL, supra note 124, at 212; Schwartz, supra note 124, at 344-45. 
133 See Schwartz, supra note 124, at 347. 
1!14 See, e.g., PoLINSKY, supra note 74, at 57. 
135 See id. 
136 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 13, at 1084. 
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pects. A judge viewing the debtor's decision with the benefit of hind-
sight may incorrectly rule against the debtor. 
In some cases, however, debtors will have clearly spent their way 
into bankruptcy, leaving little room for judicial error. Nevertheless, 
the second-best bankruptcy system may grant relief to the spendthrift 
if society believes that some debtors are just unable to resist the temp-
tation of easy credit. Certainly there is support for this theory in the 
literature. Professor Jackson argues that the need for bankruptcy is 
largely based on cognitive and volitional failures among debtors that 
prevent them from making the right credit decisions.137 Others argue 
that society should encourage creditors to restrict access to credit, 
presumably because debtors are unable to determine when borrowing 
is in their self-in terest.188 
This does not mean that the second-best bankruptcy system ig-
nores the grasshopper problem. But because this system cannot dis-
tinguish between the grasshoppers and the truly unfortunate, society 
must make bankruptcy less attractive so that individuals have some 
incentive to avoid financial distress.l39 The repeat nature of credit 
markets, like the repeat nature of insurance markets, will provide 
some help. Just as the insured takes care to avoid the increased pre-
miums that follow an accident, the debtor will take care to avoid the 
increased interest rates and loss of credit that follow bankruptcy. 
The threat of reduced access to credit, however, is only a partial 
solution, and just as insurance contracts require the payment of de-
ductibles and insure only part of the debtor's loss, the second-best 
bankruptcy must also offer only partial insurance. That is, the second-
best bankruptcy system must be less generous than the utopian bank-
ruptcy system so that debtors will face some of the consequences of 
actions that make financial distress more likely. Exactly how much re-
lief the second-best bankruptcy system should provide is a matter of 
compromise. In the private insurance context, society does not need 
to worry about the correct level of partial insurance so long as the in-
surance contract has no negative effects on third parties;l40 the in-
sured and the insurer will agree to the most mutually beneficial terms. 
1!7 See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 232-41. 
1!!8 See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 13, at 6-8. 
1!9 By making bankruptcy less generous, society forces debtors to bear more of the 
costs of their financial failure and thus provides debtors with an incentive to avoid 
financial distress. 
140 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 124, at 351 (discussing the under-compensation of vic-
tims in the tort system). 
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Unfortunately, the optimal bankruptcy system, like the optimal tax 
and public assistance programs, is only part of a hypothetical contract, 
and therefore the correct level of partial insurance is debatable.141 
So far, this Article has treated the grasshopper problem as a func-
tion of negligence. Financial distress, however, results from far more 
culpable conduct as well. At the other extreme, the debtor may face a 
judgment for a willful tort such as sexual assault. Here the analogy to 
private insurance again provides some guidance. 
While private insurance contracts protect debtors from the con-
sequences of their own negligence, these contracts do not protect 
debtors from the consequences of their own willful misconduct. Pri-
vate insurance contracts almost always contain some clause excluding 
liability for intentional acts. 142 Even in the absence of such a clause, 
courts will often find an implied exception for intentional conduct,143 
and a contract that purported to insure an individual against willful 
misconduct would likely be held void as against public policy.144 
Therefore, if a homeowner intentionally sets fire to his house, fire in-
surance will not reimburse him.145 If a motorist intentionally hits a 
pedestrian, automobile insurance would not pay for the damages that 
would result146 and would certainly not prevent the driver from serv-
ing time in prison. 
Public insurance programs often take this same approach. For 
example, unemployment insurance will deny benefits if the unem-
ployed has engaged in willful misconduct such as a work-related fel-
141 See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 13, at 608-09 (discussing trade-off between the gen-
erous treatment of a debtor in bankruptcy and the effect that this generosity has on the 
debtor's incentives to avoid financial distress). 
142 See KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 128, at 498 ("Insurance policies typically include 
express provisions which either require that a loss be accidental or preclude coverage for 
intended results."); Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and judicial Discord over Whether Liability 
Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and Em-
pirical Review of Federal {md State Courts' Declaratory judgmr:nts-1900-1997, 4 7 AM. U. L. REv. 
1131, 1145-46 (1998) (describing the main components and clauses of a third-party liabil-
ity insurance contract); D. Heath Baily, Note, Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Harrington: Resist-
ing the Impulse to Judicially Rewrite Exclusion Clauses, 1998 BYU L. REv. 1645, 1645-46 (1998) 
(stating that insurance companies protect themselves through the use of an intentional 
acts exclusion clause). 
148 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 128, at 498 ("Thus, as discussed in the preceding 
section, courts frequently have held that even in the absence of express provisions, insur-
ance contracts only provide coverage for accidental losses."). 
IH See, e.g., id. at 519 (citing Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (NJ. 
1978)). 
mid. at516. 
146 See id. at 518. 
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ony or misdemeanor.147 Therefore, one might conclude that bank-
ruptcy should deny relief for willful misconduct as well. This assump-
tion, however, is discussed more fully below,l48 
2. Catching the Opossums: The Pessimist and the Guarded Optimist 
The utopian bankruptcy system assumes that the judge can per-
fectly estimate a debtor's earnings ability or potential earnings. To the 
extent that one rejects this assumption, one rejects the feasibility of a 
bankruptcy system based on debt-adjustment just as economists gen-
erally reject the feasibility of a progressive lump-sum tax.t49 If a judge 
cannot distinguish the high-ability debtors from the low-ability debt-
ors, a debt-adjustment system must leave all debtors with the same 
amount of debt or else those with a high-ability will just "play 'pos-
sum" and claim that they cannot repay anything.l50 Such a scheme 
would fail to meet the insurance goals assumed to underlie bank-
ruptcy. Therefore, one must search for a feasible second-best ap-
proach. What one considers feasible depends on one's assumptions 
about the actual ability of judges to identify the opossums among us. 
a. The Pessimist and Income Taxes 
Even though pessimists would reject the assumption that judges 
can observe a debtor's potential earnings, they would likely concede 
that the bankruptcy judge can observe the debtor's actual earnings 
after the bankruptcy filing. This is essentially the same assumption 
that underlies the analysis of the second-best tax,l51 and a similar re-
sult follows. According to the pessimist, the second-best bankruptcy 
147 See, e.g., RoTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 771. 
148 See infra notes 246-288 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra note 4 7 and accompanying text. 
150 This statement ignores the use of punishment to separate those debtors who can 
pay from those who cannot. By punishing the debtor when he defaults, one can again im-
plement a system that provides some relief for the destitute debtor. See, e.g., Rea, supra note 
7, at 193. Punishment may play a large role in bankruptcy. For example, the threat of the 
loss of a debtor's credit reputation may deter those debtors who can repay from filing for 
bankruptcy. This use of punishment is only appropriate in the absence of information. See 
Welch, supra note 98, at 1-2. It is entirely possible that the size of bankruptcy judges' dock-
ets prevents them, or even bankruptcy trustees, from inquiring as to the specific circum-
stances of most debtors, and therefore a punishment-based system is needed. This Article, 
however, focuses on the question of how judges should act if they had at least some infor-
mation about a debtor's ability to pay. Moreover, this reliance on punishment assumes that 
judges effectively play no role in the bankruptcy process. Therefore, this Article leaves the 
role of punishment in bankruptcy to future work. 
151 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
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system would increase the debtor's required repayment as the 
debtor's actual income increased; the second-best bankruptcy system 
would effectively include an income tax.152 This system allows some 
limited relief because the high-ability debtor would need to earn, and 
therefore consume, very little in order to "play 'possum" by emulating 
the low-ability individual. The precise characteristics of this effective 
income tax, like the precise characteristics of the second-best income 
tax, balance the individual's need for insurance against the unfortu-
nate consequences that income taxes have on an individual's desire to 
work. I 53 
b. The GuaTded Optimist and Subsequent Modifications 
A guarded optimist would believe that the pessimist understates 
the ability of judges to estimate a debtor's potential income. Some 
debtors will work in occupations that yield a fairly regular or stable 
stream of income over a number of years, and the income history of 
these debtors, along with other observable characteristics such as level 
of education, may provide a fairly good basis for estimating their po-
tential earnings. The judge, however, can never perfectly estimate fu-
ture or potential earnings; the size of a debtor's bonus or the number 
of overtime hours available to him may change from year to year. 
More seriously, the debtor may lose his job or may earn a promotion 
or a substantial raise. 
Because the guarded optimist assumes a level of information 
greater than that underlying the pessimist's view of the second-best 
bankruptcy system and yet less than that needed to implement the 
utopian bankruptcy system, the guarded optimist would choose a 
bankruptcy system that blends the two approaches. Recall that the 
utopian bankruptcy system bases debtors' required repayment solely 
on their potential income and that the pessimist's second-best bank-
ruptcy bases debtors' required repayment solely on their actual in-
152 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
155 The analysis of the proper rates for this effective income tax is a little more compli-
cated than in the tax analysis and more closely resembles the analysis of the effective rates 
that should be included in second-best public assistance programs. That is, one must con-
sider not only the effect that the effective tax has on the work incentives of those receiving 
relief but also on the work incentives of those not receiving relief. Because lower effective 
tax rates may encourage some individuals to work a little less in order to begin receiving 
relief, one cannot even conclude that an effective tax rate of 100% discourages work in the 
aggregate. See infra note 406 and accompanying text. 
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come.t54 An intermediate approach would base the debtor's required 
repayment on the judge's estimate of the debtor's potential income, 
but then allow for further modifications if the debtor's actual income 
deviated sharply from this estimate. H judges never modify the initial 
obligation, this is just the utopian bankruptcy system as the required 
repayment is based solely on the debtor's projected earnings.t55 H 
judges always modify the obligation when the debtor's actual income 
deviated from the estimate, this is just the pessimist's bankruptcy sys-
tem as the required repayment is based solely on the debtor's actual 
earnings.156 
Recall that if judges are not truly omniscient in· that they cannot 
perfectly predict the future, the utopian bankruptcy system includes 
modifications or subsequent bankruptcies to account for unexpected 
shocks.157 The utopian system would always adjust debtors' required 
repayment when the change in their circumstances was entirely due 
to fate and never adjust debtors' required repayment when the debt-
ors themselves caused the change or when the debtors failed to work 
hard enough to avoid the ensuing financial difficulties.158 That is, the 
utopian bankruptcy system adopts the same negligence standard to 
solve the grasshopper problem in the context of modifications that it 
adopts to solve the grasshopper problem in generat.t59 
The guarded optimist, however, does not advocate the strict use 
of a negligence standard in bankruptcy and would not advocate for its 
use in the modification context either. Just as judges may be unable to 
determine whether debtors' negligent misbehavior resulted in their 
initial financial distress, they may be unable to determine if the debt-
ors' misbehavior led to the need for further relief. 
Recognizing the limited ability of a judge to determine if the 
change in the debtor's circumstances resulted from fate or the 
debtor's own efforts, or lack thereof, the guarded optimist might ad-
vocate a system that modifies a debtor's required repayment only after 
a substantial change in the debtor's circumstances. Many small 
changes in a debtor's income, such as the income resulting from a few 
extra hours of overtime or a slightly larger bonus, are probably the 
direct result of the debtor's own efforts. Bankruptcy should not mod-
15i See supra notes 20, 62 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text. 
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ify a debtor's required repayment in response to these changes so that 
the debtor retains the incentive to work hard.l60 Of course, some 
small changes in financial condition, such as costs associated with a 
broken small appliance, are the result of chance and therefore, ide-
ally, should be insured. Nevertheless, by definition these changes are 
small and therefore the debtor has little need for the insurance. 
By contrast, larger changes in a debtor's financial condition may 
involve a greater element of chance. Workers may to a large extent 
earn promotions, raises, or large bonuses. Their success, however, also 
depends on the efforts of their co-workers and the overall success of 
their firm. Likewise, workers who shirk are more likely to be fired. 
Nevertheless, macroeconomic forces clearly play a role as is evidenced 
by the cyclical nature ofunemployment.I6I 
The claim that larger changes in the debtor's financial condition 
are more likely to result from chance than are small changes is an 
empirical assertion and no proof is offered. But even if this assertion 
is incorrect, one might still prefer a system that only modifies the 
debtor's obligations following a large change in the debtor's circum-
stances. These large changes will occur only infrequently and involve 
large sums of money. Therefore, it will be cost effective for a judge to 
at least conduct an inquiry as to whether the change was caused by 
fate or the debtor's own efforts and perhaps judges are correct just 
often enough to make such an inquiry worthwhile.t62 
160 This effect is probably even more dramatic if one focuses on a debtor's disposable 
income, or income net of expenses. If bankruptcy adjusted for any small change in the 
debtor's income after expenses, the debtor would have no incentive to live more frugally. 
161 For example, in 1992 the unemployment rate was at or above 7.3% each month. See 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Force Statistics from the Current 
Population Survey, available at http:/ /data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost (last visited Sept. 9, 
2002). In 2000, the unemployment rate was at or below 4.1% each month. Id. 
162 The family law context provides an interesting analogy. Most states set child support 
payments equal to the percentage of the parent's income that the child would have re-
ceived had the family remained together. Barbara R. Rowe & Kay W. Hansen, Child Support 
Awards in Utah: Have Guidelines Made a Difference7, 21 J. CoNTEMP. L. 195, 200 (1995). This 
"income share" model, however, does not require a change in child support payments 
from month to month as the parent's income changes. Rather the court sets a fixed dollar 
obligation based on the parent's income at the time of the hearing. See generally NAT'L 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A SUMMARY OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 11 (1990). The 
parties can seek a modification of the child support obligations, but unless a substantial 
amount of time has elapsed (often about three years), the moving party usually must show 
that the amount awarded would change by at least 10%. See id. at 17. 
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ill. USING THE OPTIMAL BANKRUPTCY ANALYSIS TO INTERPRET THE 
CuRRENT BANKRUPTCY CoDE 
Part II described the optimal bankruptcy procedure in the ab-
stract. This Article seeks, however, to offer guidance to real judges 
who must interpret an existing Bankruptcy Code. Using the analysis 
of Part II as a guide, this Part argues that courts should interpret the 
existing Bankruptcy Code in a way that accounts for the moral haz-
ards created by the bankruptcy system. Most courts have already 
shown a great willingness to improvise when interpreting an 
imperfect code, and a few have even been willing to ignore the plain 
meaning of the text of the code.l63 In many cases, however, the 
language of the code is either ambiguous or expressly invites 
bankruptcy judges to use their discretion to account for debtor 
misbehavior. In such circumstances, courts could address many of the 
opossum and grasshopper problems identified in this Article while 
still remaining fairly faithful to the text of the code. 
Since this Article discusses how courts should interpret specific 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, Part III-A provides a brief intro-
duction to collections law that will place these provisions in the 
proper context. Part III-B discusses how courts should address the 
grasshopper problem, and Part III-C discusses how they should ad-
dress the opossum problem. 
A. A Brief Description of Collections Law 
A complex web of state and federal laws regulate collections in 
modern America. Most consumers who fail to repay their debts 
probably do not file for bankruptcy.164 Instead, they rely on state and 
federal non-bankruptcy laws to protect them from their creditors.l65 
For example, federal law limits the manner in which a collections 
163 See infra note 328 and accompanying text. 
164 See, e.g., AM. BANKERS Ass'N, 1997 INSTALLMENT CREDIT SURVEY REPORT 109 (9th 
ed. 1997) (reporting that approximately 70% of all bank consumer credit losses occur 
outside of bankruptcy). Of course, this is a percentage of the dollar amount of outstanding 
obligations rather than individuals, and it is possible that some individuals might file for 
bankruptcy long after their creditors accounted for their debt as unlikely to be repaid. 
This figure, however, clearly implies that a large number of debtors who refuse to repay 
their loans do not file for bankruptcy. See id. 
165 Americans also have a long tradition of simply hiding from their creditors, a tradi-
tion that continues today. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One 
Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. LJ. 501, 524 (1993) (noting that lawyers sometimes 
advise their clients to evade their creditors by moving or changing their telephone num-
bers). 
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agency may contact a debtor166 and limits the amount of a debtor's 
wages that creditors can garnish to no more than 25% of the debtor's 
after-tax income.l67 Some state laws restrict garnishment even further 
or prohibit it altogether.I6B Both state and federal laws also limit the 
amount and type of physical property that the sheriff can seize to sat-
isfY a creditor's claim.169 Though property exemption laws vary con-
siderably from state to state,I7o they usually offer at least some protec-
tion to debtors for certain types of assets such as their homes,171 their 
cars,l72 and their tools.l73 Any theory of bankruptcy must consider the 
existence of these non-bankruptcy laws. 
While non-bankruptcy collections law remains extremely impor-
tant, scholars now focus more heavily on bankruptcy.1 74 As a practical 
matter, there are two forms of consumer bankruptcy: a Chapter 7 liq-
uidation and a Chapter 13 adjustment of debts.l75 A substantial major-
ity of bankrupt Americans choose a liquidation under Chapter 7.176 
Chapter 7 provides debtors with a full discharge of most unsecured 
debts,177 thereby absolving debtors of the need to repay out of their 
166 Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000). 
167 Id. §§ 1672-1673 (restricting garnishment in favor of general creditors to no more 
than the lesser of 25% of debtors' disposable earnings or the amount by which their dis-
posable earnings exceeds thirty times the federal minimum wage. "Disposable earnings" is 
defined in this context to mean roughly the debtor's take-home pay). 
166 See, e.g., TEx. PROP. ConE ANN. § 42.001 (b) (1) (Vernon 2002) (exempting current 
wages for personal services). 
169 See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text. 
170 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner et al., The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws 5-
6 (Sept. 19, 2001) (working paper, on file with the author) (describing property exemp-
tion laws). 
171 See, e.g., CAL. C1v. PRoc. ConE§ 704.730 (West Supp. 2002) (allowing homestead 
exemptions between $50,000 and $125,000, depending on household composition). 
172 See, e.g., id. § 704.010 (providing a $1,900 exemption of equity in a motor vehicle). 
m See, e.g., id. § 704.060 (providing a $5,000 exemption for tools). 
m For example, in one of the leading casebooks on debtor-creditor law only approxi-
mately 157 of 1043 pages are devoted to non-bankruptcy collections. See WARREN & WEST-
BROOK, supra note 86, at 3-1043. 
175 Individual debtors may also file under Chapter 11. In 2000, however, only 686 of 
over 1,217,000 non-business bankruptcy filings (less than .05 of 1%) were filed under 
Chapter 11. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter, 1990-2001, 
per Quarter, available at http:/ /www.abiworld.org/stats/1990nonbuschapter.html (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2002). 
176 For example, in the year 2000 approximately 69% of all non-business bankrupt 
debtors chose Chapter 7. See id. 
177 Some debts are excepted from discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000) (amended by 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, Tit. XIII,§ 803, 116 Stat. 745,801 (2002)). Secured debts, such as a 
home mortgage or an automobile loan, must be repaid in full if the debtor is to retain the 
collateral. See id. § 724(b). Therefore, many debtors reaffirm these obligations and the 
debts survive the discharge. See, e.g., Culhane & White, supra note 14, at 713 (finding that 
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future income. In theory, the Chapter 7 debtor receives this discharge 
in exchange for a damaged credit reputation and the loss of any assets 
not protected either by state property exemptions or certain bank-
ruptcy specific exemptions available in a few states.t7s In reality, ma-
nipulable179 and generous180 property exemptions ensure that only a 
tiny fraction of Chapter 7 debtors forfeit any assets to their general 
unsecured creditors. tat 
Anyone can file for relief under Chapter 7; one need not even be 
insolvent. Nevertheless, Chapter 7 does not offer effective relief to 
some debtors either because they would lose significant assets182 or 
25% of cases sampled had a reaffirmation agreement in the file); Warren, supra note 14, at 
499 (claiming that more than 40% of debtors reaffirm some debt). 
178 The Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the choice of the property exemptions of 
the state in which the debtor lives or certain uniform bankruptcy exemptions. See 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b) (1978). Section 522(d), however, also gives the states the right to "opt-out" 
and deny their debtors the use of the uniform exemptions. See id. § 522(d). Thirty-seven 
states have chosen to "opt-out" under § 522 (d). See Posner et al., supra note 170, at 16. 
179 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14, at 495 ("Exemptions were designed to help ensure 
that families were not put out of their homes in times of temporary financial reversal, but 
they have become investment vehicles for savvy debtors to protect significant cash assets 
from creditors.") (citation omitted). 
180 For example, twenty-three states allowed married couples to exempt at least 
$60,000 of home equity. See, e.g., 14 MARK BANE ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY AL-1-
WY-4 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th rev. ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001) (listing the home-
stead exemptions of each state). By contrast, in 1995 the median home equity for all fami-
lies with a head of household at least twenty-five years of age was less than $15,000. See Jo-
seph M. Anderson, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Wealth of U.S. Families: Analysis of 
Recent Census Data 6 (Nov. 10, 1999), available at 
h ttp://www.bls.census.gov I sipp/workpapr /wp233. pdf. 
181 See Bankr. Admin., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Case Receipts Paid to Creditors 
Professionals 1-2 (1994) (on file with the United States General Accounting Office, Wash-
ington, D.C.) ("Of the 1.2 million Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases closed in statistical years 
1991 and 1992, about 5% (56,994) generated some receipts for distribution to profession-
als and creditors."); see also WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 86, at 426 ("The property 
exemptions may make little difference because the debtors who file for bankruptcy may 
not own much of value that isn't already mortgaged to the hilt."). These figures may over-
state the repayment in Chapter 7 as they include business bankruptcies filed in Chapter 7 
and business bankruptcies account for nearly eighty percent of all creditor receipts in 
Chapter 7. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 137. This does not mean that consumers 
repay nothing in Chapter 7; they will often repay their secured creditors or reaffirm their 
secured loans. 
182 Although almost no debtors in Chapter 7 have non-exempt assets, it is possible that 
bankrupt debtors who do have assets choose another chapter in order to retain their 
property. See Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy 
Decision, 54]. FIN. 403, 416-17 (1999) [hereinafter Determinants]; Ian Domowitz & Robert 
L. Sartain, Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice: Evidence from the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 461,477-82 (1999) [hereinafter Incentives] (finding debtors with more equity 
in their home or car were more likely to choose Chapter 13); Romona K.Z. Heck, An 
Econometric Analysis of Interstate Differences in Nonbusiness Bankruptcy and Chapter Thirteen 
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because they have significant debts that they could not discharge in 
Chapter 7.183 Moreover, there is some evidence that bankruptcy 
judges and lawyers in some jurisdictions steer debtors away from 
Chapter 7.184 Finally, the code allows judges to dismiss Chapter 7 
filings that are a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy Code.185 Con-
gress added this provision in 1984 following extensive lobbying by 
creditors186 who were concerned with what they perceived to be a 
large increase in the number of bankruptcy filings187 and who wanted 
to force more debtors to either choose Chapter 13 or avoid bank-
ruptcy altogether. This provision, however, does not appear to have 
had its desired effect as the number of bankruptcy filings has sharply 
increased, 188 the ratio of Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 filings has remained 
fairly stable,l89 and the rate at which bankrupt debtors repay unse-
cured creditors remains close to zero.190 AS a consequence, the con-
Rates, 15 J. CoNsUMER AFF. 13, 13-16, 29-30 (1981) (examining factors influencing state 
Chapter XIII rates under the Federal Bankruptcy Act);Jon P. Nelson, Consumer Bankruptcy 
and Chapter Choice: State Panel Evidence, 17 CoNTEMP. EcoN. PoL'v 552, 553, 560 (1999). In 
addition, in Chapter 7 debtors risk losing their most valuable assets-such as their car or 
their home-unless they can either repay their secured claims in full or can convince their 
secured creditors to allow them to reaffirm their debts. See 11 U .S.C. § 724 (b). 
1ss See 11 U .S.C. § 523. 
· 184 There is some empirical support for this proposition in that scholars are unable to 
explain differences in choice of chapter by other theories tested. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sulli-
van et al., Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States: A Study of Alleged Abuse and of Local Legal 
Culture, 20 J. CoNSUMER PoL'Y 223, 244-45 (1997) [hereinafter Study of Abuse]; Teresa A. 
Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal 
Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARv.J.L. & Pus. PoL'v 801, 806, 830 (1994) [hereinafter Persistence] 
(interpreting inability to explain variation in percentage of bankrupt debtors choosing 
Chapter 13 in different bankruptcy districts to be evidence of the importance of a local 
legal cui ture). 
185 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). 
185 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 102, at 77-85 (describing lobbying efforts leading to 
amendments to Bankruptcy Code in 1984). 
187 In 1978, there were 172,000 non-business bankruptcy filings. See Michelle J. White, 
Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. LJ. 1, 29 
(1987-1988). By 1984 this figure had risen to 284,517. See Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2001, 
supra note 93. 
188 Between 1984 and 2001 the number of non-business bankruptcy filings rose from 
284,517 to 1,452,030. See Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2001, supra note 93. 
189fu 1984, approximately 68.8% of non-business filings were made under Chapter 7. 
See Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual U.S. Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter 1980-1984, 
at http:/ /www.abiworld.org/stats/1980stateannualnonbuschapter.html (last visited Sept. 
22, 2002) [hereinafter Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings 1980-1984]. By 2001 this figure 
had risen to 70.1 %. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual U.S. Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by 
Chapter 2000-2001, at http:/ /www.abiworld.org/stats/OOstateannualnonbuschapter.html 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2002). 
190 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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sumer credit industry is again pushing for reforms, commonly called 
"means testing," that would force more debtors into Chapter 13.191 
Whether these reforms would have any effect remains an open ques-
tion.l92 
Unlike Chapter 7, Chapter 13 is not open to all debtors. Chapter 
13's predecessor, Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,193 was 
restricted to "wage earners. "194 In 1978, Congress broadened eligibility 
for Chapter 13 to all individuals with regular income and debts below 
certain ceilings.195 As discussed below, the meaning of the term "regu-
lar income" has important implications for the feasibility of a reor-
ganization-based approach to bankruptcy}96 
Debtors filing under Chapter 13 propose plans that require them 
to make a series of payments for a period of up to five years.l97 The 
judge will approve the plan if it is proposed in good faith, is feasible, 
and meets certain repayment requirements.l98 If debtors make their 
payments, the judge grants them a discharge of their remaining debts, 
with relatively few exceptions.l99 Chapter 13 offers debtors a superdis-
charge that is broader than the discharge available in Chapter 7.2oo 
191 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14, at 486-88, 492-93 (describing the lobbying efforts 
of the consumer credit industry). 
192 See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy 
Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 27, 31 
(1999) (finding that only 3.6% of debtors would be classified as "can pay" under the stat-
ute);Jones & Zywicki, supra note 13 (discussing Culhane & White as well as other studies 
that find a greater fraction of debtors that can pay). 
198 Section 74 was passed in the Act of March 3, 1933, Ch. 204, 4 7 Stat. 1467 (repealed 
1938). It was later revised and incorporated into Chapters XI, XII and XIII in the Chan-
dler Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840-940 ( 1938) repealed IJy Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
194 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544, § 606 (repealed 1978). 
195 Chapter 13 is restricted to individual debtors (other than stockbrokers and com-
modity brokers) with regular income who have non-contingent, liquidated unsecured 
debts of less than $290,525 and non-contingent, liquidated secured debts of less than 
$871,550. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a), (e) (2000) (dollar amounts updated by revision of certain 
dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code prescribed under § 104(b) of the Code, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 10.910, 10.911 (Feb. 20, 2001)). 
196 See infra notes 371-406 and accompanying text. 
l97 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d). Debtors may propose plans that will last less than three years if 
they will repay their creditors in full, but this is rare. See In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669, 672-73 
(8th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Davidson, 72 B.R. 384, 387 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (com-
menting that plans providing for 100% payout are relatively rare)). Bankruptcy practitio-
ners usually use the terms "thirty-six months" or "sixty months" instead of "three years" or 
"five years." 
198 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325. 
199 See id. § 1328(a). 
200 Compare id. § 1328(a), with id. § 727(a)-(e). 
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Chapter 13's predecessor, Chapter XIII, required debtors to ob-
tain the consent of each of their secured creditors and the majority of 
their unsecured creditors before judges would approve their plan.201 
As a consequence, virtually all Chapter XIII plans offered full repay-
ment to all creditors, though often without interest. 202 Today, Chapter 
13 plans that propose full repayment, even without interest, appear to 
be more the exception than the norm,2°3 and a series of code provi-
sions determine the amount that a debtor must repay.2°4 
Court fees2°5 and priority claims, including certain tax and family 
law claims,206 must be paid in full. The debtor will also lose any collat-
eral held by a secured creditor unless the plan provides for the full 
repayment of the secured claim, though perhaps without interest, or 
the secured creditor agrees to accept less.207 Because, however, the 
201 11 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052 (1970). Incidentally, the composition agreements made 
possible by the 1874 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 required creditor con-
sent of the majority of creditors in number and three-fourths in value. See Ch. 390, § 17, 18 
Stat. 183 (1874) (repealed 1878). 
2o2 One survey found that approximately 99% of Chapter XIII plans proposed to pay 
all debts in full. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, 
REFORM 94 (1971); accord B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1 9.01, 
at 9-3 (2d ed. 1986). The consent requirement gave creditors significant bargaining power 
because many of the protections now afforded debtors in non-bankruptcy law did not exist 
during the term of the Bankruptcy Act or were introduced relatively late in its tenure. For 
example, prior to a Supreme Court ruling in 1969, many states allowed unsecured credi-
tors to attach property of the debtor prior to a judgment or even a hearing. See Sniadach v. 
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969). Federal limitations on garnishment were 
not in place until 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (2000), and many states offered little limitation 
on its use. See 2 HowARD J. ALPERIN & RoLAND F. CHASE, CoNSUMER LAw: SALES PRAc-
TICES, CREDIT REGULATION§§ 630-631, 352-354 (1986). Furthermore, the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act was not passed until 1977. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o; Pub. L. No. 95-
109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874. In addition, few states had similar provisions prior to the 
mid to late 1970s. See ALPERIN & CHASE, supra, at 352-54. 
208 See In re Leser, 939 F.2d at 672-73 (quoting In re Davidson, 72 B.R. 384, 387 (Bankr. 
D. Colo. 1987) (commenting that plans providing for 100% payout are relatively rare)). 
But see William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Con-
sumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Banktruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. LJ. 397, 
411 tbl. 2 (1994) (showing that in some jurisdictions a significant number of confirmed 
Chapter 13 plans do propose 100% repayment). 
204 See 11 U.S.C. § 1326. 
205 Id. § 1325(a) (2). 
206 Id. §§ 1322(a) (2), 507. 
2°7 See id. § 1322(a) (2). H a secured creditor holds collateral that is worth less than the 
value of its loan, its secured claim will equal the amount that it would cost the debtor to 
replace the collateral; the remainder of the secured creditor's loan is treated as an unse-
cured claim. See Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 961 (1997). Note that only 
the secured claim must be promised full repayment for the debtor to retain the collateral. 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a). This limitation does not apply, however, to the most important secured 
creditors, the mortgage lenders, who must receive the entire amount of their loans, includ-
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amount that the debtor must pay the secured creditor depends on the 
value of the debtor's physical assets rather than the value of her earn-
ings, this Article focuses on how much the debtor must pay her unse-
cured creditors. 
There are two primary tests for how much debtors must pay their 
general unsecured creditors in Chapter 13: the "best interests of the 
creditors" test of § 1325(a)(4) and the "disposable income" test of 
§ 1325(b). An unsecured creditor may object under§ 1325(a) (4) if it 
does not receive as much as it would have received in a Chapter 7 liq-
uidation.208 Though there is some evidence that debtors with 
significant non-exempt assets are more likely to choose Chapter 13,209 
the near complete lack of repayment for unsecured creditors in 
Chapter 7210 implies that this "best interests of the creditors" test may 
mean little in practice. 
Between 1978 and 1984, the only explicit test for determining the 
debtor's payment to unsecured creditors was the "best interests of the 
creditors" test of § 1325(a)(4).211 Because so few debtors have any 
non-exempt assets,212 and because creditor consent was no longer re-
quired, judges accustomed to Chapter XIII plans that proposed full 
repayment213 began to see Chapter 13 plans that proposed little or no 
repayment for unsecured creditors. It seems that this change was too 
much for some judges, and many refused to confirm plans that paid 
too little to creditors on the grounds that they were not proposed in 
good faith as required by the Bankruptcy Code.214 While this use of 
the good faith requirement was controversial at the time, it became 
even more so after the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984.215 
ing any interest specified in the mortgages, if debtors are to keep their homes. See Nobel-
man v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 325-26, 331 (1993) (interpreting 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b)(2)). 
20s 11 U .S.C. § 1325 (a) ( 4). 
209 See discussion supra note 182. 
21o See sources cited supra note 181. 
211 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (4). 
212 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
m See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
214 See, e.g., In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624, 625 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980) (refusing to confirm 
plan unless it paid 70% of unsecured claims); In re Burrell, 2 B.R. 650, 653 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1980) ("Although debtor's plan meets the best effort test, it falls considerably short of 
meeting the substantial payment requirement."). 
215 See, e.g., Noreen v. Slattengren, 974 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1992) (claiming that 11 
U.S.C. § 1325(b) subsumed most of the factors courts may have found relevant in deter-
mining good faith, but the totality of the circumstances test remained in place.); In re 
Carsrud, 161 B.R. 246, 250-51 (Bankr. S.D.S.D. 1993) ("The traditional totality of circum-
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As part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984,216 Congress added the "disposable income" test of 
§ 1325(b). Section 1325(b) states that a court may not confirm a plan 
over the bankruptcy trustee's or a creditor's objection unless the 
debtor proposes full repayment or the debtor proposes to pay into the 
plan all of his projected disposable income for a period of three 
years.217 This "disposable income" test has generated a substantial 
amount of controversy,218 and despite its central role in determining 
the debtor's required repayment and frequent litigation about its 
meaning, substantial questions remain.219 
The confirmation of a plan does not end the Chapter 13 process. 
A debtor who subsequently finds his plan too onerous has several op-
tions. Within bankruptcy, the debtor can apply for a hardship dis-
charge220 or convert the case to Chapter 7.221 Provided the case had 
not been previously converted from another chapter, the debtor may 
dismiss the plan222 and either re-file or rely on federal and state non-
stances approach ... not addressed by the legislative amendments were preserved."); see 
generally Brandon L. Johnson, Good Faith and Disposable Income: Should the Good Faith Inquiry 
Evaluate the Proposed Amount of Repayment7, 36 GoNz. L. REv. 375, 381-86 (2000-2001) (re-
viewing cases). 
216 The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
217 "Disposable income" is defined as "income which is received by the debtor and 
which is not reasonably necessary to be expended ... for the maintenance or support of 
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor .... " 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2) (2000). 
218 At first a few courts held that they could ignore this provision, reasoning that the 
term "may not" is merely permissive. See, e.g., In re Schyma, 68 B.R. 52, 63 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1985) (noting the language of§ 1325(b) (1) indicates that Congress intended to grant a 
discretionary power to the court to refuse to approve the plan, rather than to mandate 
denial of confirmation); In reOtero, 48 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (reading the 
section as a voluntary section to be applied at the court's discretion). While these decisions 
have not been explicitly overruled, few, if any, recent courts have adopted their holding 
because these early courts ignored a section of the Bankruptcy Code that explicitly states 
that the term "may not" is prohibitive and not permissive. See 11 U .S.C. § 102 ( 4). 
219 Much of the controversy about this provision centers on the difficulty courts face 
when determining a debtor's "reasonably necessary" expenses. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra 
note 23, at 471-73. This Article's analysis can readily extend to this issue. A utopian bank-
ruptcy system would account for differences in each debtor's cost of living and allow each 
debtor to consume as much as he would have contracted for in advance. To the extent, 
however, that courts are unable to determine this amount, either directly or by using ob-
servable characteristics of the debtor as a proxy for what the debtor would have agreed to, 
they must ignore expenses entirely or each debtor will have an incentive to overstate his 
cost of living. 
220 11 u.s.c. § 1328(b). 
221 Seeid. §§ 1307(a), 1307(e). 
222 Id. § 1307(b). 
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bankruptcy laws for protection.223 Finally, § 1329 allows the debtor, 
the Chapter 13 trustee, and the unsecured creditors to seek a 
modification of the plan prior to the completion of payments.224 
While parties may seek modifications for many reasons, 225 this Article 
focuses on requests for a modification of the required repayment in 
response to a change in the debtor's financial condition. 
B. Bankruptcy and the Grasshopper Problem 
Part IT implies that in managing the grasshopper problem, courts 
should treat negligent and willful misbehavior separately. To a large 
extent, the existing bankruptcy system does just that. Bankruptcy 
grants relief to debtors who spend too much or engage in other neg-
ligent behavior, but Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code denies relief 
for willful misbehavior. By its terms Chapter 13, however, will grant a 
discharge for many forms of willful misbehavior. Courts have strug-
gled to reconcile Chapter 13's expanded discharge with sound policy 
goals. 
Few, if any, commentators argue that courts should deny bank-
ruptcy relief to the spendthrifts or the negligent, and proposals to 
partially eliminate Chapter 13's expanded discharge have generated 
little public comment.226 This silence is explained in part by bank-
ruptcy's similarities to, and differences from, standard insurance. 
1. The Negligent Grasshopper and Means Testing 
The utopian bankruptcy system denies relief to the debtor who 
negligently borrows too much or fails to take sufficient precautions to 
avoid financial distress; essentially, utopian bankruptcy denies relief to 
the negligent.227 By contrast, the existing bankruptcy system does not 
22s Because federal limitations on garnishment do not apply in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, it is possible that debtors could be required to repay more in bankruptcy than they 
would under non-bankruptcy law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000). 
22•seell U.S.C.§ 1329 (1978). 
225 See generally Harry L. Deffebach, Postconjirmation Modification of Chapter 13 Plans: 
Sheep in Wolf's Clothing, 9 BANKR. DEv.J. 153, 155-66 (1992). 
226 Of course, this silence may also be explained by the absence of an effective interest 
group to lobby on behalf of tort victims. Proposed legislation would significantly erode the 
superdischarge, eliminating the debtor's ability to obtain a discharge for: i) loans procured 
by fraud or false pretenses; ii) debts for fraud, embezzlement or larceny; and iii) debts for 
willful and malicious injury to a person. See H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 314(b) (4) (2002). 
Debtors would still be able, however, to obtain a discharge of willful and malicious torts 
that resulted in damage to property. ld. 
227 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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distinguish between the negligent and the unfortunate. Some debtors 
are in bankruptcy because they could not control their spending hab-
its, others because they suffered some unavoidable expense, and still 
others because of a combination of misfortune and misbehavior.22s 
They all receive the same discharge, however, and bankruptcy law 
makes little or no effort to distinguish between them. 
Chapter 7 does allow the bankruptcy judge to dismiss a filing if 
granting relief would be a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy 
Code,229 and in looking for abuse courts do inquire into the totality of 
the circumstances.230 Courts focus, however, on whether the debtor 
can in fact pay his debts rather than on whether the debtor should 
have acted more responsibly to avoid incurring such debt in the first 
place.231 That is, courts focus on whether the debtor needs bank-
ruptcy relief rather than on why the debtor needs bankruptcy relief. 
Therefore, the substantial abuse provision appears designed primarily 
to deal with the opossum problem rather than the grasshopper prob-
lem.232 
228 Most, if not all, bankruptcy scholars would agree that at least some debtors are in 
bankruptcy because of their poor spending habits, though they would likely disagree as to 
the size of this group. See, e.g .• Braucher, supra note 13, at 7 ("It would be hard for anyone 
to disagree with the proposition that Americans have too much debt and not enough sav-
ings, and that if we had less debt and more savings, there would be less bankruptcy."); 
Jones & Zywicki, supra note 13, at 224 ("In short, one can simply recharacterize the 'debt 
causes bankruptcy' thesis as 'overspending causes bankruptcy'"); LoPucki, supra note 23, 
at 464 ("The grasshoppers eat at the pizza parlor on Friday night and buy the new sneakers 
and the houses. They quit their jobs when the going gets tough. The fallout lands on their 
credit cards. When winter comes, they discharge the credit card debt in bankruptcy."); 
Warren, supra note 13, at 1084 ("Some incur [excessive] debt with little thought about how 
it adds up, perhaps like the grasshopper who never thought about the coming winter."). 
229 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). 
280 See, e.g., In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1, 
1 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572-73 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 
933, 936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
251 While most, if not all, courts would consider the debtor's ability to pay in the sub-
stantial abuse analysis, there is broad disagreement as to the meaning of the phrase "sub-
stantial abuse." Some courts hold that an ability to pay one's debts alone supports a finding 
of substantial abuse. See, e.g., United States Tr. v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74, 77 (8th Cir. 1992); 
accord In reKelly, 841 F.2d 908,914-15 (9th Cir. 1988). Other courts, however, find that an 
ability to pay one's debts is not sufficient by itself to find substantial abuse. See In re Green, 
934 F.2d at 572-73. Still, most courts seem to regard the ability to pay as the primary con-
sideration in the substantial abuse analysis. See, e.g., In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 809 (lOth 
Cir. 1999); see also In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d at 4-5. 
252 Occasionally, one finds a case that focuses primarily on the circumstances sur-
rounding the incurrence of the debt. These cases, however, generally involve intentional, 
as opposed to negligent, behavior. See, e.g., In re Bruno, 68 B.R. 101, 102-03 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 1986) (dismissing filing because husband sought to discharge debts resulting from 
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Although numerous scholars have written about the grasshopper 
problem of bankruptcy,233 there are no serious proposals for denying 
a bankruptcy discharge to those who overspend or otherwise negli-
gently cause their own financial distress. Even the credit industry has 
not tried to limit the grasshopper's access to bankruptcy,234 preferring 
instead to lobby for means testing that would identify those debtors 
who can pay more. As a matter of theory, means testing requires only 
that the debtor prove that he needs relief; means testing does not ask 
the debtor to explain why he needs relief. Therefore, like the substan-
tial abuse provision, means testing appears aimed primarily at the 
opossum problem rather than the grasshopper problem. 
In light of the analysis of Part II, this approach is unsurprising. 
The first lasting bankruptcy law in the United States,235 the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898236 was passed at about the same time that courts 
began to allow individuals to insure against liability for negligent mis-
conduct.237 Because bankruptcy is another form of insurance, the 
justifications for insurance that protects the negligent would seem to 
apply to bankruptcy as well. Many, if not most, bankrupt debtors are 
unable to pay their debts both because they suffered some unfortu-
nate shock such as divorce or unemployment and because they bor-
rowed too much to allow them to withstand such a shock.238 Society 
may not trust the ability of bankruptcy judges to determine if these 
debtors behaved prudently and therefore deserve relief. Moreover, 
even when it is clear that debtors spent their way into bankruptcy, so-
ciety may not want to deny relief because many believe that some 
debtors just cannot resist the temptation of easy credit.239 
murder of his wife). As discussed below, Chapter 7 has more direct limitations on relieffor 
such behavior. See infra note 248 and accompanying text. 
m See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
21!4 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14, at 493 ("The creditors as a group did not quarrel 
with relief for those in need; instead, they emphasized that consumer bankruptcy should 
be available only to those in need."). 
29 The Constitution grants Congress the power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws. See 
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, d. 4. Prior to 1898, however, Congress enacted three bankruptcy 
acts that together lasted less than twenty years. Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 
1800 in 1803, 2 Stat. 248 (1803), the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 in 1843, Act of March 3, 1843, 
5 Stat. 614 (1843), and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 in 1878, Act of june 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99 
(1878). Of course, state law did afford early debtors some protection from their creditors. 
Seegmerally CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1934). 
2!16 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
m See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
2ss See, e.g., Warren, supra note 13, at 1081 (discussing the characteristics of bankrupt 
debtors). 
239 See supra notes 137-148 and accompanying text. 
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But the second-best bankruptcy system does not ignore the 
grasshopper problem altogether. Precisely because courts cannot or 
will not identify the negligent, the second-best bankruptcy system of-
fers only partial relief to the unfortunate as well.240 Debtors receive 
only partial insurance to the extent that they are worse off after bank-
ruptcy than they would have been had they behaved in the proper 
manner. In practice, the bankrupt debtor will emerge with severely 
damaged credit, and, possibly, a damaged social reputation. 241 On the 
other hand, the debtor will have enjoyed, at least temporarily, a 
higher standard of living than if he had behaved prudently. In addi-
tion, the debtor may still retain some of the assets purchased on 
credit. Therefore, bankruptcy should ask the debtor to repay some-
thing to his creditors. 
Though debtors in Chapter 7 pay virtually nothing to their unse-
cured creditors,242 they often reaffirm debts to secured creditors so 
that they may retain their home, their car, or other assets pledged as 
collateral.243 Whether this system causes the debtor to suffer enough is 
open to debate, and if means testing forced debtors to pay more in 
bankruptcy, it could reduce the level of insurance they receive. 
Whether this means testing is warranted remains controversial as 
commentators strongly disagree as to the importance of the grass-
hopper problem in bankruptcy.244 
2. The Willful and Malicious Grasshopper, the Superdischarge and 
Good Faith 
Because neither private contracts nor public insurance programs 
relieve individuals of the consequences of their willful misbehavior,245 
Part II suggests that bankruptcy should not do so either. Traditionally, 
bankruptcy adopted this approach. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
240 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
241 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEx. REv. L. & PoL. 
393, 395-408 (2001). 
242 See supra note 181. 
248 See supra note 181. This approach does offer some advantages in that the debtor 
and creditor can contract in advance for the minimum amount that the debtor must repay 
in bankruptcy. Unfortunately, the usefulness of this strategy is limited by an inability to 
pledge one's future income as collateral. Because the amount that must be repaid in 
Chapter 7 is independent of the debtor's future income, this test provides imperfect insur-
ance and is subject to abuse. 
244 Compare jones & Zywicki, supra note 13, at 192-200, 248, with Warren, supra note 13, 
at1084-87, 1100-01. 
245 See supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text. 
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barred the discharge of debts arising from most forms of willful mis-
conduct whether under a Chapter VII liquidation246 or a Chapter Xlli 
wage earner's plan.247 Today, Chapter 7 largely retains and expands 
the exceptions to discharge of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898.248 
By contrast, Chapter 13 provides a superdischarge that is broader 
than the discharge available in Chapter 7 and can forgive, among 
other things: i) loans procured by fraud or false pretenses, ii) debts 
for fraud, embezzlement, or larceny, and iii) debts for willful and ma-
licious injury.249 Because of the · superdischarge, and because tort 
claims often do not count toward the dollar limitations of Chapter 
13,250 the reported Chapter 13 case law is populated in part by debtors 
facing judgments or claims for fraud,251 embezzlement,252 misappro-
246 See 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)). 
247 See id. § 1060 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), (c)-( d) (2000)). 
246 See id. § 523. 
249 See id. § 1328(a). Originally, Chapter 13 would discharge judgments for criminal 
restitution as well. See Pa. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990). 
Shortly after this case, Congress excepted criminal restitution from the superdischarge. See 
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, Tit. XXXI, § 3103(3), 104 Stat. 4789, 
4916 (1990) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3)). In 1994, however, Congress changed its 
mind, and current law no longer excepts criminal restitution from the superdischarge 
(although§ 1328(a)(3) still applies to cases filed before Oct. 22, 1994). See Pub. L. 103-
394, § 501 (d) (38)(b) (1994). Proposed legislation would significantly erode the superdis-
charge, eliminating the debtor's ability to obtain a discharge for: i) loans procured by 
fraud or false pretenses; ii) debts for fraud, embezzlement or larceny; and iii) debts for 
willful and malicious injury to a person. See H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 314(b) (4) (2002). 
Debtors would still be able, however, to obtain a discharge of willful and malicious torts 
that resulted in damage to property. /d. 
250 The Bankruptcy Code limits Chapter 13 to debtors with non-contingent, liquidated 
unsecured debts of less than $290,525. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (dollar amounts updated by 
Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code prescribed under Section 
104(b) of the Code, 66 Fed. Reg. 10.910, 10.911 (Feb. 20, 2001)). Pending tort claims, 
however, will generally not count toward this amount either because they are contingent 
(the tort claimant must win at trial) or they are unliquidated (the court cannot determine 
the amount of the claim until the trial). See, e.g., 14 MARK BANE ET AL., supra note 180, at 
t 109.06 [2] [b]-[c]. 
251 See, e.g., In rePeterson, 228 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998); In reMcBroom, 51 
B.R. 953,955 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985). 
2s2 See, e.g., In re Nipper, 224 B.R. 756, 757 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1998); In re Britt, 211 B.R. 
74, 76 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997). 
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priation,253 aggravated assault,254 intentional shooting,255 sexual as-
sault,256 sexual abuse of a minor,257 and other willful misconduct. 
Congress left little record to indicate why it adopted the super-
discharge. The commission appointed to study bankruptcy recom-
mended that Congress retain the existing exceptions to discharge in 
both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and the legislative history reveals no 
justification for why this recommendation was rejected.258 The super-
discharge has changed little since 1978,259 however, and a recent study 
by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission did not suggest a 
substantive change to this policy.260 This continued support for the 
superdischarge must be reconciled with the law's general hostility to-
ward insurance that protects an individual from the consequences of 
his willful misconduct.261 
The traditional explanation for the superdischarge is that it in-
duces debtors to file under Chapter 13 and thereby increases the re-
payment for all creditors.262 Given that in 1978, Chapter 13 did not 
require the debtor to repay any more than he would have in Chapter 
7,263 this explanation for the original superdischarge is questionable. 
It is at least possible, however, that Congress thought that debtors 
would pay more,264 and some may support the continued existence of 
255 See, e.g., In reKelly, 217 B.R. 273,274 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1997); In reLedin, 179 B.R. 
721, 722 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
254 See, e.g., In re Day, 1999 WL 96117, *1 (7th Cir. 1999) (Table decision at 172 F.3d 52) 
(aggravated battery); In reEasley, 72 B.R. 948,948 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987). 
255 See Handeen v. LeMaire, 898 F.2d 1346, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990). 
256 See, e.g., Solomon v. Cosby, 67 F.3d 1128, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995); Petty v. Belanger, 232 
B.R. 543, 545 (D. Mass. 1999) (decided under Chapter 7, although debtor originally filed 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 13); In re Carsrud, 161 B.R. at 247. 
257 See, e.g., Slattengren, 974 F.2d at 75. 
258 Robert L. Hughes, Chapter 13's Potential for Abuse, 58 N.C. L. REv. 831, 843 (1980) 
("Though Section 1328(a) represents a congressional rejection of the Commission's posi-
tion on t[he] issue [of the exceptions to discharge], the legislative history offers no expla-
nation for that decision."). 
259 Since 1978, Congress has excepted some debts from the superdischarge, including 
criminal restitution (from 1990-1994). See supra note 249. 
260 See, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 290-91. Notwithstanding the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission's views, however, proposed legislation would significantly 
erode the superdischarge. See supra note 249. 
261 See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text. 
262 See, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 290-91. 
26! See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
264 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 258, at 845. Moreover, what little legislative history that 
does exists suggests that some Congressmen accepted the superdischarge under the pre-
sumption that the requirement of creditor approval would result in some check on this 
provision. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, at 175 (1973) (In considering proposed 
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the superdischarge if the disposable income requirement now results 
in a greater repayment under Chapter 13.265 
Even if the superdischarge maximizes the repayment to the 
creditor, however, the same could be said of an insurance policy that 
covers willful torts; the victim could demand payment from a solvent 
insurance company rather than an insolvent tortfeasor. While bank-
ruptcy effectively mandates that the creditor insure the debtor against 
the debtor's willful misconduct, non-bankrupt<y insurance law gener-
ally prohibits insurance policies that cover willful misconduct.266 Courts 
refuse to allow such insurance policies on public policy grounds, rea-
soning that these insurance contracts will lessen the deterrence that 
judgments for willful torts are designed to deliver. 267 Because the su-
perdischarge also lessens the deterrent effect of the tort law, one 
needs a justification for why bankruptcy requires this insurance. 
Recall that there are two justifications for insurance policies that 
cover negligence. First, judges and juries will sometimes err when de-
ciding whether a defendant was negligent and therefore society 
should allow the individual to insure against this error.268 For exam-
ple, a court could wrongfully find that a motorist negligently drove at 
an excessive speed and caused an accident. This same argument ap-
plies to intentional misconduct, though perhaps with lesser force. For 
example, a court may wrongfully find that a motorist intentionally 
struck a pedestrian when in fact he did so by accident. There is no 
reason to believe, however, that Congress changed its view of the 
competency of the judiciary in the late 1970s. 
By contrast, the period surrounding the passage of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did see a change in the law's basic assump-
legislation analogous to the current Chapter 13, the commission stated, "If the debtor 
wants to pay his debts pursuant to a plan, and if the creditors are willing to go awng, he should 
be allowed to do so. The fact that a discharge would not be available in a liquidation case 
should furnish a greater incentive for the debtor to perform under the plan."(emphasis 
added). Perhaps Congress assumed that this would mean that Chapter 13 plans would 
continue to routinely include full repayment of unsecured creditors and did not 
sufficiently revisit the issue when the creditor consent requirement was dropped. 
265 See, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 291. 
266 See, e.g., Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (NJ. 1978) (adopting a 
minority rule allowing such insurance policies if they benefit innocent third parties, but 
recognizing that a majority of courts do not allow insurance for willful misconduct); KEE-
TON & Wm1ss, supra note 128, at 519 (stating that insurance law generally prohibits insur-
ance policies covering willful misconduct). 
267 See, e.g., Montes, 388 A.2d at 606 (noting that the majority of courts reason that 
"[w]ere a person able to insure against the economic consequences of his intentional 
wrongdoing, the deterrence attributable to financial responsibility would be missing."). 
266 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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tions about the ability of individuals to control their own actions, the 
second explanation for insurance that covers negligent behavior.269 To 
the extent that individuals are simply unable to control their own ac-
tions, the deterrence value of judgments becomes much less impor-
tant relative to the other goals that these judgments serve, such as 
compensating the victim. 
This shift in view of individual responsibility can be most clearly 
seen in the criminal law. For example, the insanity defense tradition-
ally focused on whether the defendant understood the nature and qual-
ity of his actions or the wrongfulness of his actions.270 In 1962, how-
ever, the American Law Institute wrote the Model Penal Code, which 
expanded the insanity defense to include defendants who could ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of their actions but who were unable to con-
trol their actions and to conform their conduct to the requirements of 
law.27I The D.C. Circuit adopted this approach in 1972,272 and during 
the 1960s and 1970s a significant minority of state legislatures and 
courts, and almost all of the federal circuit courts,273 followed suit. 
Similarly, this period witnessed an expansion of the doctrine of dimin-
ished capacity that reduces a homicide from murder to manslaugh-
ter.274 This culminated in the now infamous "Twinkie defense" in 
which an individual shot and killed both the mayor of San Francisco 
and a supervisor but was found guilty of only manslaughter after argu-
ing that he was suffering from depression as evidenced by an excessive 
consumption of Twinkies.275 The 'Twinkie defense" and John Hinck-
ley's acquittal of the attempted murder of President Reagan helped 
spark a backlash against this trend.276 This backlash came too late, 
269 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
21o SeeM'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,719 (H.L. 1843). 
271 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 4 n.9, 348-49 (3d ed. 2000). Prior to this 
time, many jurisdictions had adopted an "irresistible impulse" test that also looked to the 
ability of the defendant to control his conduct. See id. at 339-40. 
272 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
27S See LAFAVE, supra note 271, at 350. 
274 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 367-70 (2001) (dis-
cussing expansion of this doctrine in California judicial opinions and in the enactment of 
the Model Penal Code). 
275 See People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 404-05 (1993). 
276 After John Hinckley was acquitted of the attempted murder of President Reagan 
for reasons of insanity, Congress passed a statute that returned federal courts to something 
akin to the M'Naughten Rule. FRIEDMAN, supra note 275, at 405; see 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000). 
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however: the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was passed in the same 
year as the homicide in the Twinkie case.277 
Regardless of whether these changes are related to the creation 
of the superdischarge, other forms of insurance continue to refuse to 
shield individuals from the consequences of their willful misbehav-
ior,278 and therefore the superdischarge remains an anomaly. Courts 
have reacted to this anomaly by turning to another section of the 
code, the requirement that a plan be proposed in good faith,279 to 
limit the availability of the superdischarge. 
A minority of courts have refused to use this good faith test to 
question the debtor's pre-petition conduct,280 either because they be-
lieve that Congress intended a narrow definition of good faith,281 or 
that the debtor is merely making use of a statutory right.282 A 
significant majority of courts, however, read good faith more broadly 
and will consider the nature of the debt sought to be discharged.283 
277 See White, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 613. 
278 See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text. 
279Seell U.S.C.§ 1325(a)(3) (2000). 
280 See, e.g., Keach v. Boyajian, 243 B.R. 851, 857, 868 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000); In re Gath-
right, 67 B.R. 384, 385 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986). But see In re Scotten, 281 B.R. 147, 149 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (considering pre-petition conduct to determine good-faith despite 
Keach's lack of consideration of such a factor). 
281 These courts reason that because courts did not look to the debtor's pre-filing con-
duct when applying the good faith standard in Chapter Xill of the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898, modern courts should not look to pre-filing conduct when applying the same good 
faith standard in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Keach, 243 B.R. at 868-71. 
Chapter xm did not offer a superdischarge, however, so courts were generally not con-
fronted with plans that sought to discharge debts arising out of willful misconduct. See 
supra note 24 7 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if a debtor did file a plan that 
sought to discharge such a debt, the creditor consent requirements of Chapter xm meant 
that the plan would almost invariably propose to pay all debts, including unsecured debts, 
in full. See supra note 202. 
282 See, e.g., Keach, 243 B.R. at 868 ("The contrary view of good faith, so prevalent in the 
case law, is blatandy inconsistent with a debtor's clear statutory rights."). Furthermore 
commentators sometimes suggest that the plain meaning of§ 1325(a) (3) precludes the 
consideration of pre-petition conduct because it only requires that the plan be proposed in 
good faith. See, e.g., 3 KEITII M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY§ 180.1, at 180-89 (3rd 
ed. 2000) ("It is more difficult to explain that distant debtor conduct-for example, at the 
time of incurring a debt months or years before bankruptcy-illuminates the debtor's 
good faith in proposing the plan."); Bradley M. Elbein, The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and 
Morality in Chapter 13, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 439, 456 (1997) ("The explicit terms of 
§ 1325(a) (3) require only an evaluation of good faith in the proposal of the plan .... "De-
spite the plain meaning of the statute, only a minority of courts apply§ 1325(a) (3) as writ-
ten.). 
288 See, e.g., In re Day, 1999 WL at *4; Gier v. Farmers State Bank of Lucas, 986 F.2d 
1326, 1328-29 (lOth Cir. 1993); Robinson v. Tenantry, 987 F.2d 665, 668 n.6 (lOth Cir. 
1993); Slattengren, 974 F.2d at 77; LeMaire, 898 F.2d at 1349; 3 LuNDIN, supra note 282, at 
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Generally, the courts that use the good faith standard to police pre-
petition willful misconduct do not flatly deny access to the superdis-
charge. Rather, consistent with the public policy goal of retaining 
adequate deterrence, these courts sometimes will grant a discharge of 
debts arising from willful misconduct, but only after the debtor has 
shown that he has received significant punishment for his actions or is 
sufficiently remorseful.284 Perhaps this inquiry into the debtor's par-
ticular circumstances provides an explanation for why the superdis-
charge protects bankrupt debtors from the consequences of their will-
ful misconduct while other insurance policies may not. While tort 
liability plays an important role in deterring willful misconduct, soci-
ety also relies on other tools for deterrence, such as criminal liability. 
Because bankruptcy is a judicial process, a judge can review the 
debtor's circumstances and determine if the debtor has received 
enough punishment from other sources to satisfy the need for deter-
rence. 
In conducting the good faith analysis, however, courts do not just 
focus on the punishment the debtor has received; they consider the 
nature of the victim and the financial impact that the plan would have 
on the victim.2B5 Consequently, debtors guilty of severe pre-petition 
misconduct may be forced to make a greater effort at repayment than 
would other debtors.2B6 
180-89 ("The courts persist in finding relevance to good faith in [pre-petition] debtor 
conduct without finer distinctions. The reported decisions bucking this (illogical) trend 
can be counted on few fingers."). 
2at See, e.g., In re Anadell, 190 B.R. 309, 310, 312 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (citing the 
fact that attorney debtor had lost his law license and was incarcerated in deciding to ap-
prove plan paying approximately 10% of judgment for misappropriation of funds); In re 
Corino, 191 B.R. 283, 290-91 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("As a consequence for embezzling 
funds from [the bank], Debtor has already served time in prison, has forfeited a savings 
account and since 1989 has paid [the bank] approximately $6,500 pursuant to varius wage 
garnishment orders .... Debtor not only appeared repentant, but her efforts in negotia-
tion and her proposal to pledge all of her disposable income to a five year plan demon-
strates a willingness to pay her debt .... "). 
285 See, e.g., In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710, 722-23 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) ("The identity of 
the creditor, whether institutional or individual, is certainly relevant. The personal impact 
of the debtor's conduct on an individual creditor, both at the time of the infliction of the 
injury and in its future, is also significant .... The extent to which the debtor's payment 
proposal would make the objecting creditor financially whole is another factor for consid-
eration."). 
285 See 3 LuNDIN, supra note 282, at§ 184.1, 184-7 ("In anticipation of a good-faith ob-
jection to confirmation, the debtor guilty of pre-petition criminal misconduct should con-
sider a five-year plan that maximizes payment to the victim."). 
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Because this Article focuses on the standard consumer lending 
transaction, it largely ignores the interests of the creditor. In the stan-
dard consumer lending transaction, this approach is justified because, 
in the long run, the debtor largely bears the cost of bankruptcy in the 
form of higher interest rates and reduced access to credit.287 This 
analysis, however, obviously does not apply to the tort victim. To the 
extent that bankruptcy law discharges judgments for torts, it truly 
shifts the loss from tortfeasors to tort victims. In addition, tort victims 
are poorly situated to bear this risk as they cannot easily diversify it 
away like the consumer lender can. In short, the tort victim is a very 
poor insurer of the tortfeasor and a rational bankruptcy policy must 
balance the interests of both creditor and debtor.288 
C. Bankruptcy and the Opossum Problem: Assessing the Debtor's 
Ability to Pay 
Even if society decides that an individual deserves some relief, it 
still must determine how much relief is appropriate. Ideally, bank-
ruptcy would only grant the debtor as much relief as he needs and 
require the debtor to repay an amount commensurate with his ability 
to pay. To the extent that one's ability to pay is related to his earning 
ability, Chapter 7 fails to accomplish this task. While many debtors 
repay some amount in Chapter 7, this amount is not based on in-
come. Rather, a tiny minority of debtors repay unsecured creditors 
out of their non-exempt assets, and a larger number of debtors 
reaffirm secured loans.289 Chapter 7 may still play a role in an optimal 
bankruptcy system if restricted to debtors whose incomes are so low 
that a court would have them repay nothing in bankruptcy.29° Perhaps 
287 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
288 Perhaps this need to consider the creditor's interest explains why Congress chose to 
offer the superdischarge only to those debtors who complete a Chapter 13 plan; the super-
discharge is unavailable to debtors who receive a hardship-discharge in Chapter 13. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1328(a)-(c) (2000) (applying to hardship discharges granted pursuant to 
§ 1328(b) ). Of course, the inability of a tort victim to easily absorb the loss makes the dis-
charge of other tort judgments problematic as well. 
289 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
290 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Braucher, supra note 13, at 13 
("fhe premise that supports our current system is that the overwhelming majority of peo-
ple who file in Chapter 7 do not have enough to repay much of anything ... ."). Chapter 7 
may also play a role if it is too costly for judges to collect any information about debtors. In 
this case, society may wish to rely on punishment to deter the debtor from falsely claiming 
a need for relief. See Rea, supra note 7, at 196, 206. Chapter 7 may embody this punish-
ment-based approach to bankruptcy through the loss of collateral and the harm to the 
56 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 44:1 
this is why much of the current policy debate over means testing fo-
cuses on whether a debtor can repay his debts.291 This section focuses, 
however, on those debtors who should repay something in bankruptcy 
and asks how bankruptcy should collect this amount. 
Recall from Part II that the utopian bankruptcy system leaves the 
debtor with some debts that he must repay, but reduces these debts to 
an amount commensurate with his potential earnings.292 Recall too 
that the pessimist rejects the underlying assumption of utopian bank-
ruptcy-that judges can estimate a debtor's potential earnings-and 
therefore insists that society should adopt a second-best bankruptcy 
system that bases the debtor's required repayment on his actual earn-
ings.293 
This tension between the utopian and pessimistic views of bank-
ruptcy is reflected in the cases arising under Chapter 13. The lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Code invokes the utopian bankruptcy system 
in that it bases the debtor's required repayment on his estimated or 
projected earnings.294 Many courts, however, are skeptical of their 
own ability to estimate a debtor's future income and therefore seek to 
create a system that bases the debtor's repayment at least in part on 
his actual earnings. In order to do so, some courts are willing to 
significantly stray from the plain meaning of § 1325(b). This ap-
proach is unfortunate because these courts could better account for 
their own limitations through other provisions of the code.295 For in-
stance, if judges are concerned that their estimates may, on occasion, 
significantly understate the debtor's actual earnings, then they can 
order the debtor to report her income to the bankruptcy trustee and 
rely on the interested parties to seek a modification of the plan.296 
Likewise, if judges believe that the debtor's income is simply too un-
certain to estimate, they should dismiss the debtor's bankruptcy peti-
tion on the grounds that the debtor lacks a regular income and there-
fore is not eligible for relief under Chapter 13.297 
debtor's credit reputation. Whether the punishment delivered by Chapter 7 could be bet-
ter designed is left to a future paper. 
291 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
292 See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text. 
293 See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text. 
294 Seell U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2000). 
295 See infra notes 296-297 and accompanying text. 
296 See 11 U.S.C. § 1329. 
m Seeid. § 109(e). 
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1. Projected Disposable Income 
Academics sometimes criticize Chapter 13 for discouraging debt-
ors from working by depriving them of any earnings above some fixed 
amount. 298 If Chapter 13 seized all of the debtors' disposable income, 
or all of their actual income above some allowance for what the court 
determines are their reasonably necessary expenses, then this would 
be true. Such a system would effectively operate as a prohibitive tax 
on any income earned above the fixed amount, and the debtor would 
have no incentive to work any more than required to earn that fixed 
amount. To the extent that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy emulates the 
utopian bankruptcy system by leaving debtors with a fixed or lump-
sum obligation based on their projected earnings, however, it does not 
discourage them from working at all.299 
By its terms, the "disposable income" test of § 1325 (b) does not 
base a debtor's required repayments on her actual disposable in-
come.300 Like the first-best tax or the utopian bankruptcy system, 
§ 1325(b) bases the debtor's required repayment on her estimated or 
projected disposable income; § 1325(b) requires the debtor to propose 
a plan in which she uses all of her projected disposable income to repay 
her debts.3°1 A plain reading of this section requires the judge to proj-
ect the debtor's income at the time of confirmation and set the 
debtor's repayment obligations equal to the amount by which this 
projected income exceeds the debtor's reasonably necessary ex-
penses.302 A plain reading of this statute requires the judge to invoke 
the utopian bankruptcy system. 
Some courts follow the plain meaning of this section. In 1994, in 
In re Anderson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit over-
ruled the district and bankruptcy courts' finding that the debtor 
failed to meet the requirements of§ 1325(b) (1) (b) because the debt-
or refused to sign a best efforts certification that would in effect bind 
him to pay all of his actual disposable income to his creditors.303 Rely-
ing in part on the language of the statute,304 the court held that 
298 See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 23, at 4 71. 
299 See supra notes 95-126 and accompanying text. 
soo See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). 
SOl See id. § 1325(b) (1) (b) (emphasis added). 
so2 Seeid. § 1325(b). 
sos 21 F.3d 355, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1994). 
so• Id. at 357-58. The court also relied on the ability of the trustee to modify a plan 
pursuant to § 1329 if the debtor's circumstances substantially improved. See id. at 358. As 
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§ 1325(b) (1) (b) requires only that debtors pledge payment of all of 
their projected, rather than actual, disposable income, and that there-
fore trustees may not require debtors to sign best efforts 
certifications. 305 
Although some jurisdictions have followed Anderson, 306 a few 
courts have required debtors to promise a repayment contingent on 
their actual income.307 Unfortunately, the reasoning employed by 
these courts is not always clear. At least one court that required a 
debtor to sign a best efforts certification simply ignored the word 
"projected,"308 as did another court that required debtors to increase 
plan payments whenever they were able to secure additional overtime 
work or when they actually received benefits from a profit sharing 
plan.309 Another court required the debtor to pay an amount equal to 
his projected disposable income plus half of any amount by which his 
actual disposable income exceeded his projected disposable in-
come.310 Although this court explained that§ 1325(b) (1) (b) did not 
require a debtor to pay all of his actual disposable income,311 it did 
not explain why the debtor's actual disposable income was relevant at 
all.312 
discussed below, this is an example of the "guardedly optimistic" approach to bankruptcy. 
See infra notes 334-369 and accompanying text. 
805 See In re Anderson, 21 F.3d at 357-58. 
806 See, e.g., In re Bass, 267 B.R. 812, 819 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001); In reJobe, 197 B.R. 
823, 826 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996). 
807 See infra notes 308-312 and accompanying text. 
808 See In reAkin, 54 B.R. 700, 702-03 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985) ("The recent amendments 
to the Bankruptcy Code require that all of the debtor's disposable income to be received 
in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan 
will be applied to make payments under the plan."); see also In re Fitak, 121 B.R. 224, 228-
29 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (stating in dicta, "[t]his court takes note that had Creditors 
filed an objection to the Second Amended Plan as confirmed, the Debtors would have 
been required under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) to automatically submit all disposable income to 
the Trustee over the course of the next three years."). A later decision of the Bankruptcy 
Court of the Southern District of Ohio, In re Bass, adopted the In rn Anderson approach and 
thus limited the preceden tial value of In re Fitak. See In rn Bass, 267 B.R. at 819. 
809 See In re Smith, 222 B.R. 846, 858, 860 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998). 
810 See In re Krull, 54 B.R. 375, 378 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985 ). This approach was later fol-
lowed in In re Riggleman, 76 B.R. Ill, 114 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (quoting In re Krull, 54 
B.R. at 378). As noted above, however, the Southern District of Ohio has since followed the 
approach of In re Anderson. See In re Bass, 267 B.R. at 819. Note that this effectively creates a 
50% marginal income tax rate on top of whatever other taxes the debtor is paying. 
811 See In re Krull, 54 B.R. at 378. 
812 One suspects that the court relied on the good faith provision of 11 U.S.C. § 
1325(a) (3). 
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Much more perplexing are the decisions within the Ninth Circuit 
that have, subsequent to Anderson, required debtors to include a dis-
posable income clause in their plan.313 A disposable income clause 
appears to be functionally equivalent to a best efforts certification in 
that debtors promise to repay with all of their actual disposable in-
come.st4 In the 2001 decision In re James, the Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Idaho explicitly acknowledged the binding precedent 
in Anderson, yet still based its denial of confirmation in part on the 
debtor's failure to include a disposable income clause in his plan.315 
Given the abundant evidence that the debtor's plan was not proposed 
in good faith,316 one would like to assume that the court's insistence 
on a disposable income clause was merely an isolated occurrence of 
harmless error. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case. 
The James court references other bankruptcy court decisions within 
the Ninth Circuit that ignore the binding precedent in the jurisdic-
tion, including a decision by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 
Ninth Circuit that states, in dicta, that a disposable income clause is 
required whenever a trustee or the holder of an unsecured claim ob-
jects to the plan.st7 Moreover, one case cited suggests that, at least in 
m See supra notes 304-309 and accompanying text. 
SHIn theory, a disposable income clause could be little more than a statement that the 
plan complies with the "projected disposable income" test and thus does not necessarily 
mean that the debtor has pledged to repay with all of his or her actual disposable income. 
Nevertheless, this is not the meaning ascribed by some courts that require debtors to in-
clude such clauses as a condition of confirmation. According to these courts, the purpose 
of such a clause is to allow the unsecured creditors to benefit from any increase in the 
debtor's actual income. See, e.g., In rejames, 260 B.R. 498, 514 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) 
("The purpose of including a disposable income clause is to allow unsecured creditors to 
share in the debtor's post-confirmation improvement in circumstances.") (citing J.R. Hol-
lister Co. v. Jackson, 95 I.B.C.R. 183, 185 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995 )); see also In re Wages, 92 
I.B.C.R. 75, 78 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992) (stating that a disposable income clause mandates 
the debtor to consult with the Trustee regarding any available funds). But see Max Recov-
ery, Inc. v. Than, 215 B.R. 430, 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) ("The plan did not contain a 
'best efforts' or 'disposable income' provision stating that all of debtor's projected dispos-
able income ... would be applied to the plan payments.") (emphasis added). 
SIS See In re James, 260 B.R. at 513-14. 
SIS Among other things, the court found that the debtor failed to disclose assets, al-
lowed the claim of a very large debt to a family member that conflicted with statements 
that the debtor made to the Internal Revenue Service, attempted to give preferential 
treatment to certain creditors, attempted to discharge large court fines for discovery abuse 
in litigation against one of his major creditors, and attempted to discharge the claims of 
his ex-wife who had a substantially lower income than he did. Id. at 505-12. 
Sl7 See Than, 215 B.R. at 432 ("Such [a] provision [a disposable income clause] is re-
quired following an objection to plan confirmation by § 1325(b) ... ."); Jackson, 95 
I.B.C.R. at 185 ("Section 1325(b) (1) makes it clear that such a requirement [a disposable 
income clause] need only be included as a condition of plan confirmation '[i]f the trustee 
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Idaho, debtors are routinely forced to include such clauses in their 
plans.3IS One suspects that even if these plans are not required for 
confirmation, many debtors may simply agree to their inclusion to 
prevent the trustee from invoking a host of objections.319 
Some of the courts that require disposable income clauses try to 
distinguish their facts from those of Anderson by stating that such a 
clause is only required when a trustee or a creditor objects to a 
plan.32° This distinction, however, clearly fails because the trustee ob-
jected in Anderson as well;32I the requirement of a trustee or creditor 
objection determines whether § 1325(b) applies at all, not whether 
projected or actual disposable income must be promised.322 Jackson, 
one of the decisions cited by James, recognizes the futility of trying to 
distinguish Anderson and claims that the law on this point is unclear.323 
While this may be true generally, this is not true within the Ninth Cir-
cuit, where Anderson should serve as binding precedent for lower 
courts.324 
What is consistent in each of the decisions that base debtors' re-
quired repayment on their actual income is a pessimism about the 
judge's ability to accurately estimate debtors' earnings. This pessi-
mism has caused judges to ignore the plain meaning of the statute 
and, in the case of the bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Circuit, the 
binding precedent in their jurisdiction as well. The judges in these 
cases almost invariably express frustration at their inability to accu-
rately forecast debtors' earnings. For example, the court may believe 
that the debtor may earn future promotions or raises or may be able 
or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to confirmation ... .'") (alteration in 
original). 
518 jackson, 95 I.B.C.R. at 185 ("Disposable income clauses are routinely included in 
plans confirmed in this District, probably not because debtors find such a requirement 
attractive, but rather, the Court suspects, because the standing Chapter 13 trustees in 
Idaho usually object to confirmation of any plan that does not include such a clause. While 
the law on this point is somewhat unclear, the Court has sustained such objections .... ") 
(citation omitted). 
519 See id. 
520 See, e.g., Than, 215 B.R. at 432 ("Such [a] provision [a disposable income clause] 
need only be included as a condition of confirmation '[i]f the trustee or the holder of an 
allowed unsecured claim objects to confirmation ... .'"). 
s21 See In re Anderson, 21 F.3d at 356-57. 
522 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2000) (beginning, "[i]f the trustee or the holder of anal-
lowed unsecured claim object .... "). 
525 See jackson, 95 I.B.C.R. at 185. As contrary precedent this court cites a bankruptcy 
case from the District of Idaho that predates In re Anderson. See id. (citing In re Wages, 92 
I.C.B.R. at 78). . 
524 See supra notes 314-319 and accompanying text. 
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to work additional overtime.325 The clearest expression of this pessi-
mism can be found, however, in the context of the recently extended 
Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, "Adjustment of Debts of a Family 
Farmer With Regular Annual Income."326 Chapter 12 contained a pro-
jected disposable income test that, for the purposes of this Article, is 
worded identically to § 1325(b).327 In 1994, in &wley v. Yarnall, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the plain 
meaning of the statute required it to base the debtor's repayment only 
on the debtor's projected income, yet chose to ignore the word "pro-
jected" in the statute.!l28 It did so because it feared that the debtor 
would merely predict that disposable income will be zero, and thus 
render the entire disposable income test meaningless.329 Effectively, 
the court feared that it would be unable to project debtors' income 
and that therefore debtors would have an incentive to "play 'possum" 
and grossly understate their future income.3!1o 
To the extent one shares the skepticism of these courts in their 
ability to estimate a debtor's future income, one would reject a debt-
adjustment bankruptcy system as doomed to failure. This, however, 
does not justify an interpretation that ignores the plain meaning of 
§ 1325(b). Courts can address their concerns by adopting readings of 
other sections that do less violence to the plain meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.m If a court believes that it can provide a fairly good es-
timate of the debtor's earnings, but that there is some risk of a big 
S25 See, e.g., In re]ames, 260 B.R. at 515 ("And in any event, the Court cannot clearly 
foresee when or in what amounts Debtor's income and billable hours would increase if his 
plan were confirmed."); In re Smith, 222 B.R. at 858, 860 (requiring debtors to submit peri-
odic financial reports and use any actual income above projected income to repay credi-
tors because debtors had previously worked a significant amount of overtime hours and 
received distributions from a profit sharing plan); In re Akin, 54 B.R. at 703 ("[I] t appears 
that the debtor's employment history and ability to earn and likelihood of future increase 
in income is such that there will be increases in income which will be available for addi-
tional payments."); In re Krul~ 54 B.R. at 377 ("Thus there is a good chance that his earn-
ings will increase as he gains on-the-job experience, yet the proposed plan makes no provi-
sion for future increases."). 
S26 Congress just passed an extension of Chapter 12. See Act of Dec. 19, 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-377, 116 Stat. 3115 (extending Chapter 12 until june 30, 2003). 
S27 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2000) (Section 1225(b) contains language not found in 
§ 1325(b) allowing the court to extend the three-year payment period under § 1222(c), 
and § 1325(b) contains language not found in § 1225(b) excluding charitable contribu-
tions from disposable income.) 
S2S 22 F.3d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1994). 
529 See id. 
sso See id. 
m See infra notes 332-333 and accompanying text. 
62 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 44:1 
change in the debtor's circumstances, it can rely on future 
modifications to account for this problem.332 If the court truly believes 
that it does not have a sufficient basis to estimate the debtor's future 
income, then it should dismiss the Chapter 13 filing due to a lack of 
regular income.333 
2. Plan Modifications 
Even the guarded optimist of Part II does not believe that judges 
are omniscient and therefore rejects the utopian approach of basing 
the debtor's required repayment solely on projected income. Just be-
cause judges are not omniscient, however, does not mean that they 
have no ability to project the debtor's income. Rather, one might rea-
sonably believe that judges can often use the debtor's past income to 
provide a fairly good estimate of the debtor's future income, but that 
on occasion this estimate will prove fairly inaccurate. As discussed in 
Part II, this greater confidence in the ability of judges leads one to 
advocate an intermediate approach between the utopian bankruptcy 
system that adjusts the amount of an individual's debts based on pro-
jected income and the pessimist's bankruptcy system that is effectively 
a tax on actual income. The optimist's bankruptcy system adjusts 
debts based on the debtor's projected income but then adjusts these 
debts again when the debtor's actual income deviates drastically from 
the projected amount.334 This is at least a partial description of the 
approach that Chapter 13 actually takes. To understand how bank-
ruptcy reacts to a drastic change in debtors' financial condition, it is 
best to separate an improvement in debtors' condition from a dete-
rioration in their condition. 
a. Sharp Decline in Financial Condition 
The extremely low completion rate of Chapter 13 bankruptcies335 
suggests that judges often overestimate debtors' ability to pay.336 A fall 
552 See infra notes 334-369 and accompanying text. 
555 See infra notes 371-406 and accompanying text. 
554 See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text. 
55~ See, e.g., SuLLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 215-17 (finding a two-thirds failure rate 
for Chapter 13 cases); see a~o Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bank-
ruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 557, 557 
(2001) (finding that a majority of plans in sample were not completed); Marjorie L. Girth, 
The Role of Empirical Data in Deueloping Bankruptcy Legislation for Individuals, 65 IND. LJ. 17, 
40-42 (1989) (finding completion rate of 63% in sample of post-confirmation Chapter 13 
cases in Buffalo, N.Y); Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical 
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in debtors' ability to pay, however, does not necessarily result in a 
failed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. If debtors' actual income falls sharply 
below the projected amount, debtors may seek a modification to re-
duce their required repayment337 or, in an extreme case, may seek a 
hardship discharge.338 
The prospect of post-petition relief creates a further grasshopper 
problem: to the extent that bankruptcy insulates debtors against an 
additional fall in their earning ability, they have less incentive to work 
hard. Because of this, some have argued that courts should not grant 
a modification when the decline in the debtor's financial condition is 
due to the debtor's own actions.339 This, however, is just the utopian 
solution to the grasshopper problem that is generally rejected both 
inside and outside of bankruptcy due to a concern that judges will be 
unable to distinguish those who deserve relief from those who do 
not.340 
Though few, if any, reported cases deny relief to debtors on the 
grounds that they caused their own financial distress, the high failure 
rate of Chapter 13 plans suggests that this may occur in practice or 
that debtors sometimes find it too costly to seek a modification. This 
does not mean, however, that debtors receive no relief for the subse-
quent shock that they endure. That is, Chapter 13 does not require 
debtors to make the payments under their plan. Debtors may be able 
to reduce their required repayment without obtaining judicial ap-
proval by converting their filing to Chapter 7341 or by simply dismiss-
ing their case342 and relying on non-bankruptcy protections. 
Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 415, 440 
(1999) (finding completion rate in one district in Mississippi of 32%); Whitford, supra 
note 203, at 411 tbl.2 (finding that only 31% of Chapter 13 cases in study closed as com-
pleted). 
S!IS For confirmation, a judge must find that the debtor is likely to be able to complete 
his plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (6) (2000). Judges, however, may not be responsible for a 
significant portion of the failure rate. A large number of debtors may file under Chapter 
13 solely to obtain temporary relief through the automatic stay and may have no intention 
of completing a plan. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14, at 502 ("The Commission received a 
great deal of testimony from debtors' attorneys asserting that many people do not file for 
Chapter 13 in order to receive a discharge; they file only for the automatic stay."). 
ss7 See 11 U .S.C. § 1329. 
sss See id. § 1328(b) (1). 
ss9 See Gross, supra note 102, at 146. 
540 See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text. 
541 See11 U.S.C. § 1307(a), (e). 
542 See id. § 1307(b). 
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b. Sharp Improvement in Financial Condition 
Perhaps more interesting is the fact that § 1329 explicidy allows 
the Chapter 13 trustee or an unsecured creditor to seek a 
modification to increase the debtor's required repayments.343 Al-
though the mechanics of the Bankruptcy Code do not work well in 
this context, most courts are willing to play an interstitial role and al-
low for modifications that increase the required payments even when 
the standards to be applied are unclear at best. 344 They are willing to 
do so because even those courts that follow the plain meaning of pro-
jected disposable income are at best guarded optimists. 
Congress amended § 1329 to allow creditors to share in the im-
provement of the debtor's circumstances,345 but provided no standard 
for determining the amount by which the repayments should in-
crease. Though§ 1329 has occasionally been used to force debtors to 
pay following an appreciation in their assets,346 this Article focuses on 
the debtor's income. When assessing how much of the increased in-
come the debtor must pay to the creditor, the natural measure is the 
projected disposable income test of § 1325 (b). It is not at all clear, 
however, whether the projected disposable income test applies to a 
proposed modification. For example, though § 1329 specifically ref-
erences four code sections that apply to modifications, including 
§ 1325(a), it does not direcdy mention the disposable income test of 
§ 1325(b).347 Some courts have therefore held that the disposable in-
S49 Id. § 1329(a) (1). 
S44 See infra notes 351-352 and accompanying text. 
S45 See Oversight Hearings on Pers. Bankr. Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial 
Law of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 97th Cong. 215, 221 (1984) (statement of Hon. 
Conrad Cyr, Bankr. J. for the Dist. of Me., on behalf of the Nat'! Bankr. Conf. and the Nat') 
Conf. of Bankr. Judges); 14 MARK BANE ET AL., supra note 180, at 'l[1329.03 ("This 
amendment is intended to carry the ability-to-pay standard forward to any modifications of 
the plan, allowing upward or downward adjustment of plan payments in response to 
changes in the debtor's circumstances that substantially affect the ability to make future 
payments."). 
946 A few courts would apply the best interests of the creditors test of§ 1325(a) (4) to 
capture appreciation of the debtor's assets beyond the relevant exemptions. See, e.g., In re 
Barbosa, 236 B.R. 540, 554, 556 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (applying the best interests of the 
creditors test as of the date of the modification), afj'd on other gmunds, sub nom., Barbosa v. 
Solomon, 243 B.R. 562 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd 235 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000). But see Forbes v. 
Forbes, 215 B.R. 183, 189-90 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply the best interests of 
the creditors test as of the date of the requested modification). For a general discussion of 
this issue, see 3 LUNDIN, supra note 282, § 254.1. 
S47 See 11 U.S.C. § 1329. 
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come test does not apply to modifications.348 Even if one does apply 
§ 1325 (b) to a proposed modification, there are further complica-
tions.349 The most significant among these is that § 1325(b) is re-
stricted to projected disposable income and therefore arguably 
should not capture unexpected increases in the debtor's actual in-
come.350 
Despite these problems, most courts are generally willing to use 
the projected disposable income test to allow creditors to capture 
some of the benefits of an unanticipated increase in the debtor's 
financial circumstances.351 Moreover, even some of the courts that re-
ject the use of the disposable income test in the modification context 
would still allow a bankruptcy court to consider an increase in the 
debtor's income when ruling on a creditor's requested modification 
to increase payments under a plan.352 
This willingness to modify plans erodes the importance of the 
distinction between projected disposable income and actual disposable 
income. As one bankruptcy judge and commentator put it, "[i]f 
WI See, e.g., In re Moss, 91 B.R. 563, 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); accord Forbes, 215 B.R. 
at 191; In re Coleman, 231 B.R. 397, 401 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999); In re Anderson, 153 B.R. 
527, 528-29 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1993). Section 1325(a) itself references§ 1325(b), how-
ever, and therefore the disposable income test is arguably incorporated indirectly into 
§ 1329. This argument is complicated by the fact that such logic results in redundancy, as 
one of the cross-references, § 1325(a) (1), references all "provisions of this chapter" and 
therefore includes the sections that§ 1329 explicitly references. See 3 LUNDIN, supra note 
282, § 255.1, at 255-1 to 255-4. A second problem is that, by its terms, the disposable in-
come test only applies upon the objection of the trustee or an unsecured creditor and at 
least one court has therefore held that the disposable income test cannot apply unless the 
creditor or the trustee objected to the original plan. See, e.g., Than, 215 B.R. at 437. One 
might instead read § 1325(b)'s requirement of an objection to the confirmation of the 
plan to refer to the modification, but this creates its own difficulties. H the trustee or an 
unsecured creditor is moving to increase payments under the plan, then it will be the 
debtor who is objecting and therefore the requirements of§ 1325(b) are not met. 
M9 Some of the questions are more mechanical in nature, such as whether the three-
year period of the disposable income test should be measured from the beginning of the 
plan or from the time of modification. See 3 LuNDIN, supra note 282, § 255.1, at 255-7 to 
255-9. 
550 See id. § 255.1, at 255-6 to 255-7. 
551 See, e.g., In re Freeman, 86 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Martin, 232 B.R. 29, 37 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re Studer, 237 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998); 3 LUNDIN, 
supra note 282, § 255.1, at 255-2 ("A majority of the reported decisions apply the dispos-
able income test at modification of a confirmed plan, though many do so without com-
ment or analysis."). 
s~2 In re Than, 215 B.R. at 436 ("Although we hold herein that§ 1325(b) does not ap-
ply to this plan modification, we also remand with instructions that the bankruptcy court 
consider the Powers standard, along with factors affecting modification expressedly or im-
pliedly raised by the pleadings. Some factors might include: 1) Than's increased income, if 
any, due to the changed circumstances and any change in his expenses .... "). 
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§ 1325(b) is applied at modification after confirmation, the result re-
fused in Anderson comes in through the back door .... "353 Because 
judges are not omniscient, however, this ability to modify a plan when 
a projection of income proves drastically wrong is central to the 
justification for initially basing debtors' required repayment on their 
projected income. In fact, Anderson, the leading case holding that the 
projected disposable income test of§ 1325(b) does not require debt-
ors to promise to repay with all of their actual disposable income, 
based its holding in large part on the ability of creditors to seek a sub-
sequent modification should the debtors' circumstances improve.354 
Before one decries Chapter 13 for capturing debtors' actual in-
come and thereby removing their incentive to work, one should note 
the general lack of reported cases in which courts increase debtors' 
required payments in response to an increase in debtors' earned in-
come.355 In addition, most, if not all, of the reported cases in this 
category involve a drastic increase in income caused at least in part by 
circumstances beyond the debtor's control,356 In Arnold,357 the court 
modified the plan payments after the debtor, a paper product sales-
man, had an increase in income of over 150%.358 While salespeople 
are compensated through commissions precisely because their own 
efforts are important in generating sales, larger economic forces and 
corporate decisions play a strong role as well. In Louquet, 359 the court 
modified the plan payments after the debtor, a self-employed insur-
!!55 3 LuNDIN, supra note 282, § 255.1, at 255-7. 
554 In re Anderson, 21 F.3d at 358 ("Under§ 1329, the trustee may request modification 
of the debtor's plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a). H the debtor or a creditor objects to the 
modification, the trustee 'must bear the burden of showing a substantial change in the 
debtor's ability to pay since the confirmation hearing and that the prospect of the change 
had not already been taken into account at the time of confirmation.'"). 
!!55 Since 1984, debtors have filed over five million Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. See 
Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter, avaiwble at 
http:/ /www.abiworld.org/stats/bychapter.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2002). Though, ad-
mittedly not all cases are reported, a fairly diligent search in on-line databases revealed 
only three reported cases of this type. See In re Arnold, 869 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1989); In re 
Louquet, 125 B.R. 267 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991); In re Powers, 202 B.R. 618, 618 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1996). 
!!56 Recall that under the utopian approach to modifications, judges would always 
change the required repayment following a change in debtors' circumstances that was not 
caused by their own efforts. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
557 869 F.2d at 240. 
558 The debtor's income had increased from about $80,000 a year to about $200,000 
per year.' !d. at 241. 
!159125 B.R. at 267. 
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ance adjuster, had an increase in income of approximately 45%.360 In 
Powers,361 the debtor, a card dealer, also had an increase in income of 
about 45%.362 In addition, this income was reported only after her 
employer adopted a tip-allocation method that made it much harder 
to hide cash tips.363 
Still, because the income of these individuals also depended on 
their own efforts, the possibility of a modification may discourage 
similarly situated debtors from working to increase their income. Crit-
ics of Chapter 13 often point to the debate over the proper structure 
of public assistance programs for the idea that the debtor must retain 
some of the marginal dollar earned.364 Economists have found, how-
ever, that critics of public assistance programs overstated the effective 
tax rates these programs create by ignoring how they are actually im-
plemented. In calculating earnings to be counted against benefits, 
welfare caseworkers generally deduct numerous expenses, and errors 
in favor of the beneficiary often creep into the calculations.365 This 
results in recipients being allowed to keep some of the additional dol-
lars earned. This effect is perhaps more pronounced in bankruptcy as 
each of the above debtors retained at least half of the increase in his 
earnings. In Louquet, the debtors' income grew by almost $1,000 per 
month while the trustee only sought an increase in payments of $350 
per month.366 In Arnold, the debtor's monthly income increased by 
over $10,000 and yet his payments were only increased by $700 per 
month.367 The debtor's gross income in Powers increased by approxi-
mately $1,000 per month but her payments increased by only $500 
560 I d. at 268. 
56t 202 B.R. at 618. 
562 I d. at 620. 
565 The casino began pooling tips and distributing them based on the number of hours 
worked; prior to this change the debtor had used the amount of tips assumed by the In-
ternal Revenue Service. Jd. 
564 See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 23, at 471. 
565 Burtless, supra note 15, at 63. In addition, even if the programs do create a 100% 
marginal tax rate, it is possible, as a matter of theory, that they increase the incentive to 
work in the aggregate because they discourage some individuals from receiving public 
assistance. See infra note 406 and accompanying text. 
566125 B.R. at 268. 
567 869 F.2d at 243 ("Arnold's arguments that the increased payments will discourage 
him from working hard ring hollow in light of the fact that, although his monthly gross 
income in December 1987 was nearly $10,000 higher than at the time of the Chapter 13 
confirmation, the bankruptcy court increased his monthly payments only by $700 per 
month. Even with the higher Chapter 13 payments, Arnold's hard work has paid off hand-
somely for him."). 
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per month because she was able to claim an increase in her ex-
penses.368 
Moreover, even if the increase in debtors' payments matches the 
increase in debtors' income, debtors may still have an incentive to ex-
pend the effort necessary to increase their income. The reason for 
this is outlined in Arnold;. as long as the underlying cause of the in-
crease in income-say a promotion, a customer contact, or a raise-
has a continuing impact after the termination of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy plan, the threat of a modification would not capture all of the 
debtor's benefit from this change.369 
3. The Regular Income Requirement and Non-Bankruptcy Law 
A bankruptcy system that adjusts one's debts based on one's pro-
jected income would be administratively burdensome if modifications 
were often necessary. Therefore, the appropriateness of this approach 
depends on the ability of judges to forecast a debtor's earnings. To 
estimate the debtor's income over the three years required by the pro-
jected disposable income test,370 courts typically multiply the debtor's 
current monthly income by thirty-six.371 
This estimation method would fare poorly if the debtor's income 
varied significantly from month to month. Section 109 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, however, restricts access to Chapter 13 to an individual 
with regular income.372 If the regular income test limited Chapter 13 
to those debtors with a fairly stable aggregate income, judges could 
accurately estimate debtors' future income by using their past income. 
One might therefore believe that an adjustment of debts approach to 
bankruptcy would work quite well. 
Unfortunately, one can interpret the phrase "an individual with 
regular income" to mean an individual with some or sufficient regular 
income rather than an individual with regular total income. To under-
stand the distinction, consider a salesperson who earns a salary of 
368 202 B.R. at 623. 
309 In m Arnold, 869 F.2d at 242-43. 
370 11 u.s.c. § 1325(b) (2000). 
571 E.g., In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Projected disposable in-
come typically is calculated by multiplying a debtor's monthly income at the time of 
confirmation by 36 months .... "); In re Anderson, 21 F.3d at 357; In re Killough, 900 F.2d 
61, 64 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (The task of estimating projected income "is usually 
accomplished by multiplying the debtor's monthly income by 36."). 
372 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). Chapter 12, an analogous provision for family farmers, is also 
restricted to a "family farmer with regular annual income." I d.§ 109(f). 
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$20,000 per year and who earned no commissions in four of the five 
previous years and commissions of $100,000 in the other year. While 
this individual has some regular income, the aggregate amount of his 
income is not regular. 
One can read § 109(e) to allow debtors with irregular total in-
come access to Chapter 13.373 The Bankruptcy Code defines "[an] 
individual with regular income" to mean an "individual whose income 
is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make pay-
ments under a plan under Chapter 13 of this title ... ,''374 Therefore, as 
long as debtors have sufficient regular income to satisfy the various 
repayment provisions of Chapter 13, they should be allowed to file in 
Chapter 13.375 
Prior to the addition of the projected disposable income test, 
judges had to determine that debtors would have sufficient income to 
make their payments,376 but judges did not need to consider debtors' 
income when determining how large those payments should be unless 
they considered the debtor's income in their good faith analysis.377 
The best interests of the creditors test asks only if the unsecured 
creditor would have received more in a Chapter 7 liquidation and 
thus focuses only on debtors' non-exempt assets.378 A few courts did 
consider debtors' income when deciding whether their plans are filed 
in good faith, but others did not.379 Therefore, in many jurisdictions 
the minimum required repayment was effectively determined by the 
value of the debtor's non-exempt assets, if any,380 and the value of any 
assets pledged by the debtor to secured creditors as collateral,3Sl This 
allowed judges to adopt a broad interpretation of the term "regular 
income." One court even ruled that a debtor had sufficiently regular 
and stable income even though future income was not readily ascer-
tainable with any degree of certainty.382 
Mter the addition of the projected disposable income test, at 
least one court has held that the debtor's income must be substan-
m See infra note 374 and accompanying text. 
S74 11 U.S.C. § 101 (30) (emphasis added). 
575 See id. 
S76 See id. § 1325(a) (6). 
m See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. 
S78Jd. § 1325(a)(4). 
579 See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. 
soo See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (4). 
SSI See id. § 1325(a)(5). 
S82 In re Hines, 7 B.R. 415, 418 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1980) (rejecting trustee's claim that 
farmer lacks regular income because his earnings are too speculative). 
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tially certain in amount and reasonably predictable.383 Most courts, 
however, continue to use an extremely broad definition of "regular 
income," and their focus remains on whether the debtor is likely to 
have the income necessary to make the payments called for under the 
debtor's proposed plan.384 Some courts do deny debtors access to 
Chapter 13 for lack of regular income, but these decisions usually in-
volve questions of whether debtors had any income at all because the 
debtors were either unemployed385 or dependent on the support of 
friends or family386 to complete their plan. It should be noted that 
even these debtors are sometimes found to have regular income.387 
The addition of the projected disposable income test may make 
such a broad interpretation of "regular income" inappropriate. As a 
matter of policy, a debt-adjustment bankruptcy system requires that 
judges be able to estimate the debtor's income and therefore requires 
the debtor to have fairly stable income. One does not need to resort 
to public policy arguments, however, to justify a change in the inter-
pretation of "regular income." One can argue that the language of 
the Bankruptcy Code requires that judges dismiss plans filed by debtors 
with uncertain aggregate income because these debtors will be unable 
to "make payments under a plan under Chapter 13 .... "3BS 
Consider how the projected disposable income test would apply 
to our hypothetical salesperson. Assume that the judge believes that 
the salesperson's earnings history indicates that there is an 80% 
chance that the salesperson will earn no commissions in a given year 
and a 20% chance that the debtor will earn $100,000 in commissions. 
Although courts typically just multiply the debtor's current monthly 
income by thirty-six, this is only a presumptive guide and does not 
preclude other estimation methods.389 While judges should not in-
58! In reHickman, 104 B.R. 374,376 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989). 
584 See, e.g., In re Murphy, 226 B.R. 601, 604-05 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998) (discussing 
precedent). 
885 See In re Smith, 234 B.R. 852, 855 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1999); In re Crowder, 179 B.R. 
571,574 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995). 
S86 See In rejordan, 226 B.R. 117, 120 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998) (debtor dependent on 
support from live-in boyfriend); In re Hanlin, 211 B.R. 147, 148 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(unemployed debtor dependent on assistance from friends and family); In re Cregut, 69 
B.R. 21, 22 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986) (debtor dependent on monthly gift from parents). 
SS7 See In re Murphy, 226 B.R. at 604 (debtor with written commitment from significant 
other to make plan payments); In reAntoine, 208 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (un-
employed carpenter with oral commitment by his wife to support plan obligations). 
S8611 u.s.c. § 101(30) (2000). 
!189 See, e.g., In re Heath, 182 B.R. 557, 559 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) ("The Anderson opin-
ion does not appear to prohibit means other than the "monthly income times 36" test for 
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elude the entire $100,000 commission,390 they should not ignore the 
prospect for earning this amount either. Financial analysts often value 
corporations based on their projected income or projected cash 
flow;391 in doing so they may discount uncertain earnings more heav-
ily, but they would not ignore them. A firm's, or an individual's, pro-
jected or expected earnings is simply the average amount that it can 
earn. In the case of our salesperson, the projected income consists of 
the $20,000 salary and an average commission of $20,000 (20% mul-
tiplied by $100,000). Hour salesperson is asked to repay an amount 
based on a $40,000 projected income and the salesperson has at least 
some reasonably necessary expenses, the salesperson ·will be unable to 
make payments the 80% of the time when he earns only $20,000. This 
would be true even if the court built in a small cushion for unex-
pected developments.392 Because the salesperson lacks sufficient sta-
ble income to make the payments that are required based on his pro-
jected income, his filing should be dismissed.393 
A debtor denied access to Chapter 13 effectively has two choices: 
file under Chapter 7 or rely on non-bankruptcy law for protection. 
calculating a debtor's projected disposable income, but it clearly requires that future in-
come be subject to some showing of projectability."); In re Killough, 900 F.2d at 66 (per 
curiam) (holding that while overtime pay should sometimes be included as projected in-
come, the potential for that debtor's overtime work was not definite enough to be in-
cluded in projected income). 
390 See, e.g., Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1987); 2 
LUNDIN, supra note 282, § 164.1, at 164-29 (reviewing cases and arguing that speculative 
increases in income should not be included in projected income). 
391 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE FI-
NANCE 73-78 (5th ed. 1996). 
392 See, e.g., In re Fries, 68 B.R. 676, 683 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); 2 LuNDIN, supra 
note 282, § 164.1, at 164-29 (reviewing cases). 
393 Although this Article argues for a change in the way "regular income" is inter-
preted, the new interpretation urged is consistent with the relevant legislative history. For 
example, in explaining that the "regular income test expands eligibility beyond wage-
earners," the Senate report states, "[t]he definition [of regular income] encompasses all 
individuals with incomes that are sufficiently stable and regular to enable them to make 
payments under a Chapter 13 plan. Thus, individuals on welfare, social security, fixed pen-
sion incomes, or who live on investment incomes, will be able to work out repayment plans 
with their creditors rather than being forced into straight bankruptcy. Also, self-employed 
individuals will be eligible to use Chapter 13 if they have regular incomes." S. REP. No. 95-
989, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5809; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 
at 311-12 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6268-69. Each of the enumerated 
individuals either receives an aggregate income stream that is fairly stable (welfare, social 
security, fixed pension income) or their eligibility is contingent on their having "regular 
income." See id. The one possible exception to this is the individual living on an investment 
income. See id. Congress was likely alluding, however, to those individuals relying on a sta-
ble stream of dividends or interest payments rather than the modern day-trader. See id. 
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First, consider how the debtor would be treated under non-
bankruptcy law. Creditors would be able to garnish the debtor's actual 
income subject to state and federallimitations;394 non-bankruptcy law 
effectively taxes the debtor's actual income. Note that this is the sec-
ond-best bankruptcy system, or the optimal bankruptcy system when a 
judge cannot estimate the debtor's potential or projected income.395 
Like all income taxes, garnishment may discourage the debtor 
from working. The marginal rates created by garnishment law, how-
ever, are not unreasonably large by the standards of income taxation. 
For example, a single debtor living in Virginia and earning $25,000 a 
year has a marginal tax rate of approximately 25.7% once all state and 
federal taxes are considered.396 H the debtor's wages are garnished, 
the total effective marginal rate will rise to approximately 44%.397 
While this rate is quite high, it is only slightly higher than the 43% 
marginal rate that the debtor would pay without garnishment if the 
debtor earned $300,000 per year, 398 and well below some historical 
federal tax rates which have reached as high as 94%.399 This compari-
son is not meant to imply that debtors in financial distress should pay 
the same effective tax rate as the very wealthy; current garnishment 
rates may be too high to allow low-income debtors to maintain a 
sufficient standard of living. Rather, it is merely meant to show that 
society is sometimes willing to accept the work disincentives associated 
with high marginal rates in order to achieve other goals. 
Of course, garnishment will have some effects that are not mar-
ginal in nature. The garnishment process may prove so administra-
tively burdensome to the debtor's employer that the employer may 
decide to simply fire the debtor. If garnishment leaves the debtor with 
too little take-home pay, the debtor may prefer to forego work alto-
gether.400 Non-bankruptcy law, however, is designed to address these 
s94 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
S95 See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text. 
896 This assumes that the individual must pay 7.65% in social security and medicare, 
5% in Virginia state taxes and 15% in federal taxes on the amount remaining after the 
other taxes are assessed. · 
897 Garnishment would seize an additional 25% of the debtor's after-tax income. 
S9s This assumes that the individual must pay 5% in Virginia state taxes and 39.7% in 
federal taxes on the amount remaining after the state taxes are assessed. This individual 
would face no marginal social security or medicare taxes because he will have exceeded 
the maximum taxes. 
S99 See Cong. Joint Comm. on Taxation, History of Federal Individual Income Tax 
Rates, available at http:/ /www.taxplanet.com/library/oldtaxrates/oldtaxrates.html#5 (last 
accessed on Oct. 8, 2002). 
400 See jACKSON, supra note 8, at 244. 
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non-marginal effects as well. For example, federal law now prohibits 
terminations in response to a garnishment order, though some doubt 
the effectiveness of this prohibition.401 In addition, note that debtors 
would only refuse to work if they have some other means of support 
such as the assistance of family and friends or public assistance; debt-
ors would not choose to forego work if this meant starvation. There-
fore, garnishment must always leave the debtor with a sufficient 
amount so that the debtor would not prefer to rely on this outside 
source of support. This problem is likely to be particularly severe for 
the low-income debtor who may earn little more than is available 
from public assistance or the non-market economy. Perhaps for this 
reason federal garnishment law also prohibits garnishment that would 
leave the debtor with take-home pay less than thirty times the federal 
minimum wage.402 
Unfortunately, simply dismissing Chapter 13 filings will not nec-
essarily lead to the optimal result. These dismissals may just result in 
more Chapter 7 filings, and Chapter 7 ignores the debtor's income 
entirely. Moreover, as a matter of theory, one cannot even conclude 
that the current federal limitations of garnishment, which allow the 
debtor to keep most of each additional dollar earned, offer debtors a 
greater incentive to work than a system that seizes all of their actual 
disposable income. To see why this is the case, it is necessary to return 
to the literature on public assistance. 
For years economists complained that public assistance programs 
that reduced a recipient's benefit with each additional dollar earned 
effectively created a 100% tax rate and thereby discouraged the re-
cipient from working.403 The same could be said of a disposable in-
come clause as debtors are required to repay with any amount above 
their reasonably necessary expenses. When economists actually stud-
ied how public assistance programs were implemented, however, they 
401 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (2000); see, e.g., Susan D. Kovac, judgment-Proof Debtors in Bank-
ruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 675, 720 n. 186 (1991) ("Was the debtor fired because his or her 
wages were garnished or because the debtor missed work to go to court or because worry 
about his or her financial situation affected the job performance?"). 
402 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
40! See Burdess, supra note 15, at 62. Legal scholars have cited this criticism of public 
assistance programs to criticize the disposable income test of Chapter 13. See, e.g., LoPucki, 
supra note 23, at 471 ("Today, even the crudest welfare proposal must leave the welfare 
recipient with some incentive to earn the marginal dollar or the proposal has no hope of 
adoption. It is generally acknowledged that if alimony and child support levels are set too 
high, they can be counterproductive by discouraging the payor from earning more money. 
Yet under the scheme of Chapter 13, the debtor who earns an additional dollar is required 
to pay that additional dollar to unsecured creditors."). 
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found that recipients did retain some of the additional income they 
earned because welfare caseworkers were liberal in allowing the re-
cipients to deduct certain expenses. 4°4 The same is likely to be true in 
bankruptcy; there is at least anecdotal evidence that debtors retain a 
large portion of the benefit of an improvement in their circumstances 
when their plans are modified to increase the required repayments.405 
Still, the marginal tax rate created by a disposable income clause 
is likely to be extremely high. But, as a matter of theory, one cannot 
conclude that a collection system with a high marginal tax rate dis-
courages work more than one with a low marginal rate. Consider a 
public assistance program again. If recipients are allowed to retain 
more of their income, the current recipients may very well work 
more. This change, however, would also make public assistance attrac-
tive to more individuals, and these new recipients would work less 
than they did before. Because benefits are still partially reduced as 
earnings increase, these individuals retain less of their marginal dollar 
earned and thus have less incentive to work. In addition, the public 
assistance gives them additional wealth, further reducing their need 
for income and their incentive to sacrifice leisure. To determine 
whether the lower rate resulted in more hours worked one must 
compare the additional hours worked by the original recipients and 
the reduced hours worked by the new recipients.406 
This same logic would apply in bankruptcy. A system that allows 
bankrupt debtors to retain more of their disposable income may en-
courage bankrupt debtors to work more. This change may, however, 
also make bankruptcy attractive to more debtors and thereby encour-
age others to file. Because bankruptcy would seize some of the dispos-
able income of these new bankrupt debtors, they would keep less of 
their marginal earnings than they did before. In addition, bankruptcy 
increases their wealth and thus reduces their incentive to work. 
Therefore, the correct method of taxing a bankrupt debtor's in-
come depends critically on empirical assumptions. This is not a deci-
sion, however, that courts are asked to make in the context of imple-
404 See Burtless, supra note 15, at 63. 
40~ See supra notes 366-369 and accompanying text. Perhaps more significantly, the 
three-year limitation on the disposable income test places a limit on the effective marginal 
rate. When debtors works to increase their wages or earn a promotion, their economic 
income includes not only their current pay but also the increase in their future earnings as 
well. Because a disposable income clause does not seize the increased future earnings after 
the termination of the plan, it does not create an effective marginal rate of 100% and 
debtors retain some incentive to work. See supra notes 366-369 and accompanying text. 
406 See Burtless, supra note 15, at 69. 
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menting Chapter 13. The language of the Bankruptcy Code makes it 
clear that Chapter 13 should only be open to those debtors with 
sufficient regular income to make the payments required by a plan 
filed under that chapter. Today, the language of the Code requires 
that these payments be set with regard to the debtor's projected or ex-
pected income. Therefore, those whose income is highly uncertain 
are unlikely to earn enough to be able to repay an amount based on 
their projected income. Dismissing these cases may not lead to the 
optimal result, but it will not lead to a result that would justify a de-
parture from the plain meaning of the statute. 
CoNCLUSION 
Bankruptcy resembles a public insurance program in that it pro-
vides assistance-in the form of debt relief-to individuals who have 
suffered some misfortune.407 Bankruptcy resembles a tax in that it 
frequently compels individuals to make payments out of their future 
income. Like public insurance or progressive taxation, bankruptcy 
creates moral hazards. Because bankruptcy makes financial distress 
less painful, it creates a grasshopper problem by encouraging debtors 
to engage in behavior, such as excessive spending, that makes distress 
more likely.40s Bankruptcy also creates an opossum problem by en-
couraging debtors to claim more relief than their actual circum-
stances require.409 With enough information, a judge can solve both 
the opossum and grasshopper problems and implement a utopian 
bankruptcy system that, like the first-best public insurance and tax 
systems, results in zero loss of efficiency. To do this, the judge would 
reduce the debts of deserving debtors to an amount commensurate 
with each debtor's ability to repay. 
While such a utopian bankruptcy system provides a useful 
benchmark, it is a poor model for public policy because it requires 
omniscient judges who can precisely determine which debtors are de-
serving of relief and how much they can earn to repay their debts.410 
Of more relevance is the second-best, or feasible, bankruptcy system, 
which accounts for the limited information real judges possess and 
the inevitable moral hazards that result from these limitations.4ll In 
407 See, e.g., SuLLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. 
408 See supra notes 26, 122 and accompanying text. 
409 See supra Part ll.A.2. 
•
10 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
m See supra Part ll.B. 
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the absence of explicit code provisions designed to solve these moral 
hazard problems, judges have seized on the discretion granted them 
explicitly or implicitly by the Bankruptcy Code to implement impor-
tant elements of this second-best bankruptcy system.412 The judicial 
approaches to the moral hazard problems resemble the approaches 
taken in actual public insurance and taxation systems. 
While the utopian bankruptcy system would instruct judges to 
solve the grasshopper problem by denying relief to the negligent, 
judges have not tried to do so.413 This approach mirrors that taken by 
both private insurance contracts and public insurance programs that 
operate in an imperfect, or second-best, world.414 Insurance generally 
protects individuals against the consequences of their own negligence 
because judges cannot always distinguish between the negligent and 
the prudent-and individuals may not be able to conform to the 
judges' expectations even if the judges could make this distinction.415 
Neither public insurance programs nor private insurance con-
tracts, however, provide relief for willful misconduct, whereas bank-
ruptcy does. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code contains a superdis-
charge that will even relieve the debtor of a judgment for a willful and 
malicious tort.416 Judicial resistence to the superdischarge is predict-
able because, in affording relief to the willful and malicious, bank-
ruptcy departed from the approach taken in other public insurance 
programs.417 Invoking the good faith standard of§ 1325(a) (3),judges 
have limited the superdischarge to those debtors who have received 
sufficient punishment (satisfying deterrence concerns) and have 
made a significant effort to repay their victims.418 In this way, judges 
have pushed bankruptcy law toward the approach that public insur-
ance programs take toward the grasshopper problem.419 
To solve the opossum problem, the utopian bankruptcy system 
would instruct the judge to reduce a debtor's obligations to an 
amount commensurate with the debtor's ability to repay. Chapter 13 
appears to embrace this approach by reducing a debtor's obligations 
to an amount commensurate with the debtor's projected income.420 
412 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
418 See supra notes 227-231 and accompanying text. 
414 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
415 See Schwartz, supra note 124, at 325. 
41611 u.s.c. § 1328 (2000). 
417 See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text. 
418 See supra Part ID.B.2. 
419 See supra Part III.B.2. 
420 Id. § 1325(b). 
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Judges resist this approach, however, because they are skeptical of 
their own ability to project income and thus fear that a debtor will 
"play 'possum" and understate future income. This skepticism causes 
some judges to adopt a strained reading of the Bankruptcy Code to 
adopt a second-best approach, a system that creates an effective tax on 
the debtor's actual income in bankruptcy. This approach mirrors the 
structure of actual taxation and public assistance programs. In gen-
eral, citizens are taxed not on what they can earn but what they actu-
ally earn. Likewise, public assistance programs frequently reduce the 
benefits paid as the recipient's actual income increases, but make no 
attempt to measure a recipient's actual abilities. 
In the bankruptcy context, however, judges may be able to ac-
count for their limited information in ways that do less violence to the 
plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. If judges can use the debtor's 
income history to provide at least a workable projection of the 
debtor's future income, they can base the debtor's required payments 
on this projection, not on actual income. This approach would be 
much closer to the ideal solution to the opossum problem and it 
should be favored, provided that the debtor's income history allows 
the judge to make a fairly accurate projection. 
In the unique context of Chapter 13, which should apply only to 
debtors with regular income,421 the debtor's past income may provide 
the judge with sufficient information to project future income. If the 
judge does not have sufficient information-i.e. if the debtor does not 
have predictable income-the statutory structure suggests that the 
judge respond by holding Chapter 13 relief to be unavailable rather 
than by imposing a tax on actual income within bankruptcy.422 
If debtors denied relief in Chapter 13 rely on state law for protec-
tion, then they will in fact receive a tax on their actual income in the 
form of a state garnishment proceeding; this is the appropriate collec-
tion mechanism for an individual with irregular income. A debtor also 
has a right, however, to file under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
This chapter ignores debtors' future income-probably their most 
valuable asset-when setting their required repayment. This Article 
suggests that, despite this anomaly, Chapter 7 may still play a role in 
an optimal bankruptcy system if restricted to those debtors who would 
repay nothing in Chapter 13. 
421 Id. § 109(e). 
422 See id. 
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Whether current bankruptcy law contains adequate mechanisms 
for limiting Chapter 7 to these debtors is questionable,423 though this 
is a topic for another day. Nevertheless, the analogy between bank-
ruptcy and public insurance is likely to yield valuable insights.424 The 
search for the proper tools to deal with the problems of poverty and 
inequality has represented one of the most vibrant areas of economic 
research for over one hundred years. Although economists have long 
agreed on a fairly simple first-best approach, they continue to vigor-
ously debate the precise form of the second-best, or feasible, program. 
Therefore, if we are interested in a feasible optimal bankruptcy sys-
tem, the public assistance and taxation literatures do not promise an 
easy answer. They do offer, however, valuable lessons and remind us 
that whatever system we do choose must be designed to operate in a 
non-optimal world. 
423 See SuLLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 13. 
424 Scholars have already noted the analogy between means-testing in public assistance 
programs and proposals for means-testing in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 16, 
at 52-56. Economists, however, suggest other mechanisms for distinguishing those who are 
truly in need from those who can in fact support themselves such as the use of punishment 
or in-kind transfers. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
